{"id":10405,"date":"2018-08-16T09:10:57","date_gmt":"2018-08-16T13:10:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/?p=10405"},"modified":"2019-07-26T07:10:38","modified_gmt":"2019-07-26T11:10:38","slug":"ladmissibilite-de-la-preuve-dun-comportement-posterieur-a-linfraction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/ladmissibilite-de-la-preuve-dun-comportement-posterieur-a-linfraction\/","title":{"rendered":"L’admissibilit\u00e9 de la preuve d’un comportement post\u00e9rieur \u00e0 l’infraction : R. v. Adamson, 2018 ONCA 678"},"content":{"rendered":"

***Mise \u00e0 jour importante ici<\/a>.<\/p>\n

R. v. Adamson, 2018 ONCA 678<\/a><\/p>\n

La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario reprend en 10 \u00e9tapes les principes gouvernant l’admissibilit\u00e9 d’une preuve d’un comportement post-infractionnel. Elle distingue entre autre les cas o\u00f9 la preuve est utilis\u00e9e purement \u00e0 titre narratif, aux cas o\u00f9 la preuve est directement utilis\u00e9e pour prouver la culpabilit\u00e9 de l’accus\u00e9 :<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

[55]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 The principles governing the admissibility and jury use of evidence of post-offence conduct[1]<\/a> are well established and not in need of lengthy recital. That said, the precedents elucidate several principles of importance in the assessment of this ground of appeal.<\/p>\n

[56]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 To begin, evidence of post-offence conduct is circumstantial evidence which invokes retrospective reasoning to link something said or done later to the speaker\u2019s or doer\u2019s participation in a prior event which constitutes the actus reus<\/em> of an offence with which she or he is charged<\/strong>: R. v. White,<\/em> 2011 SCC 13 (CanLII)<\/a>, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 433, at paras. 17, 105; R. v. B. (P.)<\/em>, 2015 ONCA 738(CanLII)<\/a>, 127 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 165.<\/p>\n

[57]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Second, the bulk of evidence of post-offence conduct enters the trial record as an unremarkable part of the narrative of relevant events: White<\/em>, at paras. 140 and 157; R. v. Cornelius<\/em>, 2011 ONCA 551 (CanLII)<\/a>, 283 O.A.C. 66, at para. 19.\u00a0 Where evidence of post-offence conduct is received as pure narrative, no special or limiting instruction about its use is required<\/strong>: White<\/em>, at para. 47.<\/p>\n

[58]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Third, as a general rule, evidence of post-offence conduct is not subject to special admissibility rules<\/strong>. Nor does it require that a trial judge caution the jury about its use in proof of guilt: White, <\/em>at paras. 105, 137; Cornelius<\/em>, at para. 19; R. v. Rosen<\/em>, 2018 ONCA 246 (CanLII)<\/a>, 361 C.C.C. (3d) 79, at para. 50.<\/p>\n

[59]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Fourth, the influence of evidence of post-offence conduct in the determination of an accused\u2019s guilt is a variable, not a constant<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

[60]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Sometimes, the Crown will tender evidence of post-offence conduct as an essential component of its case. When this is so, it is for the Crown to satisfy the trial judge, as with any item of evidence, that the evidence is relevant and admissible. To meet the modest threshold for relevance<\/em>, the Crown must establish that the evidence of post-offence conduct, as a matter of logic, common sense and human experience, has a tendency to help the jury resolve a live factual issue in the trial: White<\/em>, at paras. 36, 140, 169. To meet the admissibility<\/em> requirement the Crown must show that no exclusionary rule bars reception of the evidence<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

[61]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 In other cases, evidence of post-offence conduct will be admitted as narrative only and not enlisted as an essential component in proof of guilt.<\/p>\n

[62]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Fifth, where evidence of post-offence conduct is put forward as an integral element in the Crown\u2019s attempt to establish guilt, it is ultimately for the jury to decide, on the basis of the evidence as a whole, whether the evidence of post-offence conduct relates to the offence charged rather than to something else and, if so, how much weight, if any, the evidence should be accorded in the final determination of guilt or innocence<\/strong>: White<\/em>, at para. 137; Cornelius, <\/em>at para. 19.<\/p>\n

[63]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Sixth, as a general rule, evidence of post-offence conduct may be relevant to and admissible to assist in proof of an accused\u2019s culpability in an offence, but not on the level of that culpability<\/strong>: R. v. Czibulka<\/em>, 2011 ONCA 82 (CanLII)<\/a>, 267 C.C.C. (3d) 276, at para. 55; R. v. Stiers<\/em>, 2010 ONCA 382 (CanLII)<\/a>, 255 C.C.C. (3d) 99, at para. 55, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 150. But this rule is not unyielding. After all, relevance is a relative concept. The relevance of evidence of post-offence conduct depends upon myriad factors such as:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 the nature of the conduct;<\/li>\n
  2. \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 the facts sought to be inferred from it;<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    iii.\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 the positions of the parties; and<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 the totality of the evidence.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      No prefabricated rule determines the relevance or lack of relevance of evidence of post-offence conduct to a particular fact in issue<\/strong>: Stiers<\/em>, at para. 56.<\/p>\n

      [64]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0Seventh, experience teaches that in some cases jurors may attach more weight to evidence of post-offence conduct than is warranted. In such cases, it makes sense for judges to alert jurors to the accumulated learning of the courts about the evidence, all the more so when that learning may be counter-intuitive for at least some jurors: Cornelius<\/em>, at para. 19; White<\/em>, at para. 138.<\/p>\n

      [65]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Eighth, consistent with general principle, where evidence of post-offence conduct is admissible for one purpose but not another, as a general rule, a trial judge should expressly instruct the jury on the permitted and prohibited use(s) of this evidence<\/strong>. But failure to do so in express terms is not always fatal: Cornelius<\/em>, at para. 24; Czibulka<\/em>, at paras. 60-61; Stiers<\/em>, at paras. 61-62; R. v. Huard<\/em>, 2013 ONCA 650 (CanLII)<\/a>, 302 C.C.C. (3d) 469, at para. 83, leave to appeal refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 13.<\/p>\n

      [66]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Two further points will round out this discussion of governing principles.<\/p>\n

      [67]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Where the evidence of post-offence conduct consists of or includes advancement of an alibi, we distinguish the evidentiary value of a disbelieved alibi from that of an alibi that has been fabricated or concocted<\/strong>. A disbelieved alibi is an evidentiary naught. On the other hand, an alibi that independent evidence establishes as concocted or fabricated at the instance of an accused may support an inference of guilt, but is not <\/em>conclusive evidence of guilt: R. v. Hibbert<\/em>, 2002 SCC 39 (CanLII)<\/a>, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 445, at para. 67; R. v. Nedelcu<\/em>, 2012 SCC 59 (CanLII)<\/a>, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 311, at para. 23; R. v. Cyr<\/em>, 2012 ONCA 919 (CanLII)<\/a>, 294 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at para. 75.<\/p>\n

      [68]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Finally, a general instruction that jurors might consider an accused\u2019s \u201cwords and actions before, at the time, and after\u201d the conduct that constitutes the actus reus<\/em> of an offence in determining the accused\u2019s state of mind is simply a general guideline that encourages jurors to consider an accused\u2019s actions in their totality<\/strong>.\u00a0 As such, it is not an instruction to infer an accused\u2019s state of mind merely from conduct after the incident: R. v. Jaw,<\/em> 2009 SCC 42 (CanLII)<\/a>, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 26, at para. 25.<\/p>\n

       <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      ***Mise \u00e0 jour importante ici. R. v. Adamson, 2018 ONCA 678 La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario reprend en 10 \u00e9tapes les principes gouvernant l’admissibilit\u00e9 d’une preuve d’un comportement post-infractionnel. Elle distingue entre autre les cas o\u00f9 la preuve est utilis\u00e9e purement \u00e0 titre narratif, aux cas o\u00f9 la preuve est directement utilis\u00e9e pour prouver la […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"yst_prominent_words":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10405"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10405"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10405\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10405"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10405"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10405"},{"taxonomy":"yst_prominent_words","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/yst_prominent_words?post=10405"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}