Rappelons d’abord que la d\u00e9fense de provocation pr\u00e9vue \u00e0 l’article 232 du Code criminel ne s’applique que pour faire r\u00e9duire une accusation de meurtre \u00e0 une accusation d’homicide involontaire coupable.<\/p>\n
Ce qu\u2019est la provocation<\/strong><\/p>\n (2)<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Une conduite de la victime, qui constituerait un acte criminel pr\u00e9vu \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sente loi passible d\u2019un emprisonnement de cinq ans ou plus, de telle nature qu\u2019elle suffise \u00e0 priver une personne ordinaire du pouvoir de se ma\u00eetriser est une provocation pour l\u2019application du pr\u00e9sent article si l\u2019accus\u00e9 a agi sous l\u2019impulsion du moment et avant d\u2019avoir eu le temps de reprendre son sang-froid.<\/p>\n Questions de fait<\/strong><\/p>\n (3)<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Pour l\u2019application du pr\u00e9sent article, les questions de savoir :<\/p>\n a)<\/span>\u00a0si la conduite de la victime \u00e9quivalait \u00e0 une provocation au titre du paragraphe (2);<\/p>\n<\/li>\n b)<\/span>\u00a0si l\u2019accus\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 priv\u00e9 du pouvoir de se ma\u00eetriser par la provocation qu\u2019il all\u00e8gue avoir re\u00e7ue,<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n sont des questions de fait, mais nul n\u2019est cens\u00e9 avoir provoqu\u00e9 un autre individu en faisant quelque chose qu\u2019il avait un droit l\u00e9gal de faire, ou en faisant une chose que l\u2019accus\u00e9 l\u2019a incit\u00e9 \u00e0 faire afin de fournir \u00e0 l\u2019accus\u00e9 une excuse pour causer la mort ou des l\u00e9sions corporelles \u00e0 un \u00eatre humain.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n Dans\u00a0R. v. Land<\/a>, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario revient sur les principes s’appliquant \u00e0 cette d\u00e9fense.\u00a0La juge de premi\u00e8re instance avait conclu que le crit\u00e8re de vraisemblance n’a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 atteint et n’a pas soumis la d\u00e9fense de provocation au jury parce que l’accus\u00e9 avait lui-m\u00eame initi\u00e9 la confrontation, sachant que l’autre personne \u00e9tait arm\u00e9e. Or la Cour d’appel \u00e9tablit\u00a0qu’il n’y a pas de r\u00e8gle absolue interdisant la d\u00e9fense de provocation \u00e0 un accus\u00e9 qui a lui-m\u00eame initi\u00e9 une confrontation dont la violence \u00e9tait pr\u00e9visible. Un nouveau proc\u00e8s est ordonn\u00e9.<\/p>\n [<\/a>54]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The trial judge correctly identified the four components of the provocation defence: (1) there must be a wrongful act or insult; (2) the wrongful act or insult must be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control; (3) the accused must have acted in response to the provocation; and (4) the accused must have acted on the sudden before there was time for his or her passion to cool. The first two components constitute the \u201ctwo-fold\u201d objective element described in\u00a0R. v. Tran<\/i>,\u00a02010 SCC 58<\/span>(CanLII)<\/a>,\u00a0[2010] 3 S.C.R. 350<\/span>, at para. 25<\/span>. The latter two components comprise the \u201ctwo-fold\u201d subjective element of the defence:\u00a0Tran<\/i>, at para. 36.<\/p>\n […]<\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0ANTICIPATED VIOLENCE AND THE AVAILABILITY OF THE PROVOCATION DEFENCE<\/strong><\/p>\n [<\/a>60]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0I do find, however, that the trial judge erred in law in concluding that since Mr. Land initiated the confrontation while armed, anticipating that Mr. Doyon could become violent, there could be no air of reality to his defence. The policy position she used to buttress that conclusion \u2013 that provocation should not be available in such circumstances \u2013 is also incorrect.<\/p>\n [<\/a>61]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The trial judge was faced with \u201cself-induced provocation\u201d \u2013 a case where the provocative conduct of the deceased came about as a result of the accused initiating an aggressive confrontation:\u00a0Cairney<\/i>, at paras. 17, 42. Subsequent to Mr. Land\u2019s trial, the Supreme Court of Canada made clear that the fact that the accused induced the act or words said to constitute provocation does not preclude the defence from being raised. What is prohibited absolutely by\u00a0s. 232(3)<\/a>\u00a0is \u201cmanufactured\u201d provocation \u2013 inciting the victim to engage in a wrongful act or insult in order to generate an excuse for killing him:\u00a0Cairney<\/i>, at para. 31. But beyond this, \u201c[t]here is no absolute rule that a person who instigates a confrontation cannot rely on the defence of provocation\u201d<\/strong><\/span>:\u00a0Cairney<\/i>, at para. 56.<\/p>\n [<\/a>62]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Rather, \u201c[t]he matter is always one of context\u201d:\u00a0Cairney<\/i>, at para. 46. To be sure, the fact that an accused person has incited the provocative act is relevant to both the objective and subjective considerations that make up the defence:\u00a0Cairney<\/i>, at para. 47. The instigating role played by the accused may assist in determining whether the accused actually, subjectively expected the victim\u2019s response:\u00a0Cairney<\/i>, at para. 43. The instigating role played by the accused may also affect the objective inquiry into whether the wrongful act or insult relied upon as the provocation \u201cfell within a range of reasonably predictable reactions\u201d:\u00a0Cairney<\/i>, at para. 44. Yet even the reasonable predictability of the response is not determinative. This\u00a0may\u00a0<\/i>and usually will undermine the defence, but this is not an absolute rule. The reasonable predictability of the reaction remains to be \u201cweighed together with all other contextual factors\u201d<\/span>:\u00a0Cairney<\/i>, at paras. 44, 45.<\/p>\n [<\/a>63]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Just as there is no fixed rule prohibiting self-induced provocation defences, there is no fixed rule undermining the provocation defence where the accused initiated the confrontation while armed, anticipating that the victim could become violent.<\/p>\n [<\/a>64]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In\u00a0Cairney<\/i>,\u00a0<\/i>the accused initiated a violent confrontation with the victim, Mr. Ferguson, while armed with a firearm. Yet the court in\u00a0Cairney<\/i>\u00a0did not dismiss the defence summarily. Instead, it asked contextually, \u201cwhether there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could have a reasonable doubt that an ordinary person in [Mr.] Cairney\u2019s circumstances \u2013 which include\u00a0having initiated a confrontation at gunpoint<\/i>\u00a0\u2013 would be deprived of the power of self-control by [Mr.] Ferguson\u2019s insults\u201d (emphasis in original)?<\/p>\n [<\/a>65]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The answer proved to be no, even though Mr. Ferguson, to Mr. Cairney\u2019s knowledge, had long been physically abusing Mr. Cairney\u2019s \u201csister\u201d, and Mr. Ferguson rebuked Mr. Cairney\u2019s gunpoint lecture by responding that he would do to her what he wanted. Crucial to that decision, however, was that the immediate threat to Mr. Cairney\u2019s \u201csister\u201d had passed, Mr. Ferguson\u2019s response in rejecting the lecture was predictable, and he was walking away when Mr. Cairney shot him. The point, however, is that the fact that Mr. Cairney initiated a violent confrontation while armed with a firearm did not, standing alone, undercut the defence.<\/p>\n [<\/a>66]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, this court held in\u00a0R. v. Gill<\/i>,\u00a02009 ONCA 124<\/span>\u00a0(CanLII)<\/a>,\u00a0246 O.A.C. 390<\/span>, at para. 15<\/span>, a decision cited with approval in\u00a0R. v. Buzizi<\/i>,\u00a02013 SCC 27<\/span>\u00a0(CanLII)<\/a>,\u00a0[2013] 2 S.C.R. 248<\/span><\/span>, that there was an air of reality to Mr. Gill\u2019s provocation defence even though Mr. Gill armed himself with a knife after seeing the victim approaching his group in a menacing way with a bottle. While Mr. Gill and any ordinary person would have anticipated the prospect of an escalation in violence by retrieving the knife, the victim\u2019s taunting and violent response of swinging the bottle at Mr. Gill\u2019s head while goading Mr. Gill to stab him was enough to get the defence before the jury.<\/p>\n [<\/a>67]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The trial judge did not apply the contextual analysis required. She did not closely examine the impact in this case that Mr. Land\u2019s aggression had on the subjective and objective components of the defence. Instead, she accepted, at the Crown\u2019s prompting, the general proposition that the provocation defence is not available in self-induced provocation cases where the accused person arms himself or herself in the expectation that there will be a \u201cthreatening response\u201d.<\/p>\n [<\/a>68]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, she rejected the invitation of the defence to \u201cfine-tune expectations\u201d to consider whether Mr. Land anticipated that Mr. Doyon would respond by brandishing a sword. For the trial judge, the fact that Mr. Land anticipated violence was enough to nullify the defence. She explained that to indulge Mr. Land\u2019s argument that the sword was a \u201cgame-changer\u201d \u201cwould create a quagmire in which courts would have to assess whether one type of weapon was within the realm of expectations of violence, or expectations of a certain level of violence, whereas another weapon might not be.\u201d<\/p>\n\n