{"id":16627,"date":"2021-11-09T09:15:42","date_gmt":"2021-11-09T14:15:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/?p=16627"},"modified":"2021-11-09T15:17:54","modified_gmt":"2021-11-09T20:17:54","slug":"regle-inferences-stereotypees","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/regle-inferences-stereotypees\/","title":{"rendered":"La r\u00e8gle prohibant les inf\u00e9rences st\u00e9r\u00e9otyp\u00e9es : J.L. c. R., 2021 QCCA 1509"},"content":{"rendered":"
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J.L. c. R., 2021 QCCA 1509<\/a><\/p>\n

MISE EN GARDE : Ordonnance limitant la publication : Il est interdit de publier ou diffuser de quelque fa\u00e7on que ce soit tout renseignement qui permettrait d\u2019\u00e9tablir l\u2019identit\u00e9 de la victime ou d\u2019un t\u00e9moin (article 486.4(1) C.cr.).<\/strong><\/p>\n

Harc\u00e8lement criminelle : Le caract\u00e8re r\u00e9p\u00e9titif de l\u2019acte reproch\u00e9 devra \u00eatre prouv\u00e9 s\u2019il est celui vis\u00e9 par les sous-paragraphes 264(2)a)C.cr. ou 264(2)b) C.cr., par opposition aux sous-paragraphes 264(2)c) et 264(2)d) C.cr.[28] qui ne requi\u00e8rent pas une telle r\u00e9p\u00e9tition.<\/h2>\n

[<\/a>55]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Dans son m\u00e9moire, la poursuite soutient que le caract\u00e8re r\u00e9p\u00e9titif des gestes n\u2019est pas un \u00e9l\u00e9ment essentiel de l\u2019infraction, en s\u2019appuyant sur les propos suivants de la juge Thibault dans l\u2019arr\u00eat Bertrand c. R.<\/i> :<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

[24] \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Les cours d’appel canadiennes ont examin\u00e9 la notion de harc\u00e8lement dans cinq arr\u00eats. On peut en d\u00e9gager que la r\u00e9p\u00e9tition de l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement n’est pas un \u00e9l\u00e9ment de l’infraction de harc\u00e8lement criminel et que, dans certaines circonstances, un \u00e9v\u00e9nement unique suffit.[26]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

\n

[<\/a>56]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Dans cet arr\u00eat, la juge Thibault r\u00e9f\u00e8re d\u2019ailleurs au passage de l\u2019arr\u00eat Lamontagne<\/i>, tel que repris dans l\u2019extrait de l\u2019arr\u00eat R. c. Morrissette<\/i> reproduit pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment. Elle se fonde \u00e9galement sur l\u2019arr\u00eat R. v.<\/i> Hyra<\/i>, <\/i>o\u00f9 la Cour d\u2019appel du Manitoba signale que l\u2019article 264(2)<\/a>d) ne requiert pas la preuve d\u2019actes r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9s\u00a0:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

21 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 It is trite to say that not all harassment is criminal harassment.\u00a0 What specifically makes the harassment criminal under s. 264(2)<\/a>(d)<\/i> is when an accused engages in threatening conduct directed at the other person or any member of their family.\u00a0 While the trial judge found that the accused did engage in threatening conduct directed at the complainant by finding him guilty of the offence, he did not expressly state what the threatening conduct was that caused him to convict under subs. (d)<\/i><\/u>.<\/p>\n

22 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 When considering an offence under this subsection, it is important to note that unlike s. 264(2)<\/a>(a)<\/i> and (b)<\/i>, the word \u201crepeatedly\u201d is absent from subs. (d).\u00a0 There need not be a repetitive element to the threatening conduct for subs. (d) to be engaged.\u00a0 A single incident can constitute threatening conduct provided that it carries as a consequence that the complainant is in a state of being harassed<\/u>.\u00a0 See R. v. Kosikar<\/i> (1999), 1999 CanLII 3775 (ON CA)<\/a>, 138 C.C.C. (3d) 217 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 142 C.C.C. (3d) vi.<\/p>\n

23 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 What readily demonstrates that the accused\u2019s conduct in this case reached the level of criminal harassment under s. 264(2)<\/a>(d)<\/i> is his threatening conduct towards the complainant during Period III, when he threatens to \u201cruin her life.\u201d\u00a0 This threatening conduct is to be examined in the context of all that preceded it<\/u>.\u00a0 Indeed, the indictment specifies that the offence occurred between December 1, 2000 and August 2, 2004.[27]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

[Soulignements ajout\u00e9s]<\/p>\n

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[<\/a>57]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 N\u00e9anmoins, l\u2019ensemble de la jurisprudence \u00e0 laquelle elle r\u00e9f\u00e8re vise l\u2019application de l\u2019article 264(2)<\/a>d<\/i>) C.cr<\/a>.<\/i> sans n\u00e9cessairement couvrir tous les actes pr\u00e9vus \u00e0 l\u2019article 264(2)<\/a> C.cr<\/a><\/i>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[58]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Ainsi, la poursuite ne peut, sur la foi de ce seul arr\u00eat, pr\u00e9tendre que la r\u00e9p\u00e9tition n\u2019est jamais un \u00e9l\u00e9ment essentiel, d\u2019autant que le libell\u00e9 des sous-paragraphes n\u2019appuie pas cette pr\u00e9tention. Le caract\u00e8re r\u00e9p\u00e9titif de l\u2019acte reproch\u00e9 devra \u00eatre prouv\u00e9 s\u2019il est celui vis\u00e9 par les sous-paragraphes 264(2)<\/a>a)<\/i>C.cr<\/a>.<\/i> ou 264(2)b)<\/i> C.cr<\/a>.<\/i>, par opposition aux sous-paragraphes 264(2)<\/a>c)<\/i> et 264(2)<\/a>d)<\/i> C.cr<\/a>.<\/i>[28]<\/sup><\/a> qui ne requi\u00e8rent pas une telle r\u00e9p\u00e9tition.<\/p>\n

La crainte peut na\u00eetre d’un ensemble de facteurs et la conduite du harceleur, au fil du temps, est l’une des composantes \u00e0 prendre en consid\u00e9ration pour analyser si une personne raisonnable aurait, dans les m\u00eames circonstances, craint pour sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9.<\/h2>\n

La crainte subjective d\u2019une victime pour sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en mati\u00e8re de harc\u00e8lement criminel s\u2019\u00e9tend non seulement \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 physique, mais \u00e9galement \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 psychologique ou \u00e9motionnelle : J.L. c. R., 2021 QCCA 1509.<\/h2>\n

*** Voir aussi R. c. Rancourt, 2020 QCCA 933<\/a><\/p>\n

[68]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Pourtant, tel que le soulignait cette Cour dans l\u2019arr\u00eat C\u00f4t\u00e9 c. R<\/em>.[34]<\/sup><\/a> \u00ab [l]a crainte peut na\u00eetre d’un ensemble de facteurs et la conduite du harceleur, au fil du temps, est l’une des composantes \u00e0 prendre en consid\u00e9ration pour analyser si une personne raisonnable aurait, dans les m\u00eames circonstances, craint pour sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9 \u00bb.<\/p>\n

[69]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 De plus, la crainte de la victime d\u00e9passe le seul cadre de sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9 physique, tel que le rappelait r\u00e9cemment cette Cour dans l\u2019arr\u00eat R. c. Rancourt<\/em>[35]<\/a> :<\/p>\n

[34]\u00a0\u00a0 Je note cependant que tant dans l\u2019affaire Lamontagne<\/em> que dans l\u2019arr\u00eat R.\u00a0v.\u00a0Sillip<\/em> de la Cour d\u2019appel de l\u2019Alberta que cite la Cour, seule la crainte pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 physique des victimes \u00e9tait en cause.<\/p>\n

[35]\u00a0\u00a0 Or, les tribunaux ont depuis reconnu que la crainte subjective d\u2019une victime pour sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en mati\u00e8re de harc\u00e8lement criminel s\u2019\u00e9tend non seulement \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 physique, mais \u00e9galement \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 psychologique ou \u00e9motionnelle.<\/p>\n

[36]\u00a0\u00a0 Dans l\u2019affaire R. v. Gowing<\/em>, la Cour de justice de l\u2019Ontario affirme d\u2019ailleurs\u00a0:<\/p>\n

[…] the intention of the legislature that a victim’s fear for his or her safety must include psychological and emotional security. To restrict it narrowly, to the risk of physical harm by assaultant behaviour, would ignore the very real possibility of destroying a victim’s psychological and emotional well-being by a campaign of deliberate harassment. If conduct by an accused person constitutes embarking on a course of conduct that causes a person reasonably to fear for his or her emotional and psychological safety<\/u>, when viewed objectively, this would, in my view, constitute an offence under this section.<\/p>\n

[37] \u00a0 S\u2019il est vrai qu\u2019une simple inqui\u00e9tude ou un sentiment d\u2019inconfort ne suffisent pas pour d\u00e9clarer un individu coupable de harc\u00e8lement criminel, l\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ment de la crainte subjective n\u2019exige pas pour autant que la victime soit terrifi\u00e9e. \u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, le juge Donald de la Cour d\u2019appel de la Colombie-Britannique \u00e9nonce \u00e9galement :<\/p>\n

I do not accept the notion that victims of harassment must suffer ill health or major disruption in their lives before obtaining the protection of s. 264<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[38]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Il est ainsi possible pour un tribunal d\u2019inf\u00e9rer, \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de l\u2019ensemble des circonstances et des t\u00e9moignages, qu\u2019une personne a subjectivement craint pour sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9, et ce, m\u00eame si celle-ci n\u2019emploie pas les termes \u00ab crainte \u00bb ou \u00ab peur \u00bb dans le cadre de son t\u00e9moignage.[36]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

[Soulignements ajout\u00e9s; renvois omis]<\/p>\n

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[70]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, \u00e0 mon avis, m\u00eame en se limitant aux seuls gestes d\u00e9crits par le juge dans son jugement, ceux-ci correspondent \u00e0 un comportement mena\u00e7ant susceptible de faire raisonnablement craindre les plaignantes pour leur s\u00e9curit\u00e9 physique, psychologique ou \u00e9motionnelle aux termes du sous-paragraphe 264(2)<\/a>d<\/i>) C.cr<\/a>.<\/i>, tel qu\u2019interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 par la jurisprudence[37]<\/sup><\/a>. J\u2019ajouterai que la conclusion \u00e0 laquelle en vient le juge du proc\u00e8s, lorsqu\u2019il conclut \u00e0 l\u2019absence de crainte ou de menace ressentie par les plaignantes, est tributaire de la seconde erreur qui lui est reproch\u00e9e et qui rel\u00e8ve du recours aux st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes de la \u00ab\u00a0victime attendue\u00a0\u00bb en mati\u00e8re de violence conjugale et que j\u2019aborderai au point suivant.<\/p>\n

Le genre de st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes auxquels peut donner lieu le contexte de violence conjugale et le risque que pose la r\u00e9action de la personne moyenne face au \u00ab syndrome de la femme battue \u00bb.<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n
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[74]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Dans R. c. Lavallee<\/i>, la Cour supr\u00eame rel\u00e8ve le genre de st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes auxquels peut donner lieu le contexte de violence conjugale et le risque que pose la r\u00e9action de la personne moyenne face au \u00ab\u00a0syndrome de la femme battue \u00bb\u00a0:<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Une preuve d’expert relative \u00e0 l’effet psychologique que peut avoir la violence sur les \u00e9pouses et les conjointes de fait doit, me semble-t-il, \u00eatre \u00e0 la fois pertinente et n\u00e9cessaire dans le contexte du pr\u00e9sent litige.\u00a0 En effet, comment peut-on juger de l’\u00e9tat mental de l’appelante sans cette preuve? \u00a0On peut pardonner au citoyen (ou au jur\u00e9) moyen s’il se demande: Pourquoi une femme supporterait-elle ce genre de traitement?\u00a0 Pourquoi continuerait-elle \u00e0 vivre avec un tel homme? Comment pouvait elle aimer quelqu’un qui la battait tellement qu’elle devait \u00eatre hospitalis\u00e9e?\u00a0 On s’attendrait \u00e0 ce que la femme plie bagage et s’en aille.\u00a0 N’a-t-elle aucun respect de soi?\u00a0 Pourquoi ne part-elle pas refaire sa vie?\u00a0 Telle serait la r\u00e9action de la personne moyenne devant ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler le [TRADUCTION] “syndrome de la femme battue”<\/u>.\u00a0 Nous avons besoin d’aide pour le comprendre et cette aide, nous pouvons l’obtenir d’experts comp\u00e9tents en la mati\u00e8re.<\/p>\n

[\u2026]<\/p>\n

Toutefois, une femme qui all\u00e8gue devant un juge ou un jury avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 battue<\/u>, et qui fait valoir cela comme facteur pertinent \u00e0 prendre en consid\u00e9ration dans l’appr\u00e9ciation d’actes ult\u00e9rieurs, risque toujours la condamnation en raison de la mythologie populaire relative \u00e0 la violence domestique: Elle \u00e9tait certainement moins gravement battue qu’elle le pr\u00e9tend, sinon elle aurait quitt\u00e9 cet homme depuis longtemps. Ou, si elle \u00e9tait si s\u00e9v\u00e8rement battue, elle devait rester par plaisir masochiste<\/u>.<\/p>\n

[\u2026]<\/p>\n

La cour conclut \u00e0 la p. 379 que la situation de la femme battue [TRADUCTION] “fait l’objet d’un grand nombre de mythes et de st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes.” Cela \u00e9tant, elle [TRADUCTION] “\u00e9chappe aux connaissances du jur\u00e9 moyen et se pr\u00eate en cons\u00e9quence \u00e0 l’\u00e9lucidation par t\u00e9moignage d’expert”. Je partage cet avis.[40]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

La Cour d\u2019appel du Manitoba, faisant une revue de la jurisprudence applicable, rappelle que le recours aux mythes et st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes pour discr\u00e9diter la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 d\u2019une victime d\u2019agression sexuelle doit \u00eatre \u00e9vit\u00e9.<\/h2>\n
\n

[75]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 La Cour d\u2019appel du Manitoba, faisant une revue de la jurisprudence applicable, rappelle que le recours aux mythes et st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes pour discr\u00e9diter la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 d\u2019une victime d\u2019agression sexuelle doit \u00eatre \u00e9vit\u00e9 :<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

[46]\u00a0 The strategy of using myths and stereotypes to discredit the credibility of a complainant in an allegation of sexual violence is \u201cinvidious\u201d because such a submission is subtlety persuasive by its appeal to common sense<\/u> (Find at para 103).\u00a0 While the argument in the accused\u2019s factum focusses on the circumstances of this case and the issue of different levels of scrutiny, any doubt as to what was meant by the statement in the accused\u2019s factum that the complainant\u2019s version of the events was not \u201cplausible in the context of the situation\u201d was made crystal clear at the hearing of the appeal.\u00a0 Counsel for the accused invited the Court to interfere with the judge\u2019s credibility assessment based on a submission relying on myths and stereotypes regarding a complainant of a sexual assault and domestic violence.<\/p>\n

[47]\u00a0 During oral submissions, counsel for the accused argued that it wasn\u2019t usual for rape victims to invite perpetrators back into the house and console them (which was the complainant\u2019s evidence).\u00a0 He further argued that the complainant\u2019s credibility should have been questioned by, as counsel put it, her reckless decision after the July 2012 incident to leave the children with the accused who had apparently threatened to kill them.\u00a0 At the core, these submissions go beyond the determination of credibility based on the facts of the case and place an impermissible reliance on myths and stereotyping to discredit the complainant<\/u>.\u00a0 As Cory J explained in Osolin, \u201cinferences pertaining to consent or the credibility of rape victims which are based on groundless myths and fantasized stereotypes is improper\u201d (at p 670).<\/p>\n

[48] One of the unfortunate realities of the Canadian criminal justice system historically is the prevalence of the use by lawyers, judges and juries of myths and stereotyping to discredit female and child witnesses<\/u>.\u00a0 McLachlin CJC explained this reality in the following manner in Find (at paras 101-3):<\/p>\n

The appellant also contends that myths and stereotypes attached to the crime of sexual assault may unfairly inform the deliberation of some jurors.\u00a0 However, strong, sometimes biased, assumptions about sexual behaviour are not new to sexual assault trials.\u00a0 Traditional myths and stereotypes have long tainted the assessment of the conduct and veracity of complainants in sexual assault cases<\/u>\u2014the belief that women of \u201cunchaste\u201d character are more likely to have consented or are less worthy of belief; that passivity or even resistance may in fact constitute consent; and that some women invite sexual assault by reason of their dress or behaviour, to name only a few.\u00a0 Based on overwhelming evidence from relevant social science literature, this Court has been willing to accept the prevailing existence of such myths and stereotypes:\u00a0 see, for example, Seaboyer, 1991 CanLII 76 (CSC)<\/a>, [1991] 2 SCR 577]; R. v. Osolin,\u00a0 1993 CanLII 54 (CSC)<\/a>, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at pp. 669-71; R. v. Ewanchuk, 1999 CanLII 711 (CSC)<\/a>, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, at paras. 94-97<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Child complainants may similarly be subject to stereotypical assumptions, such as the belief that stories of abuse are probably fabricated if not reported immediately, or that the testimony of children is inherently unreliable:\u00a0 R. v. W. (R.),\u00a0 1992 CanLII 56 (CSC)<\/a>, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122; R. v. D.D., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, 2000 SCC 43<\/a>; N. Bala, \u201cDouble Victims:\u00a0 Child Sexual Abuse and the Canadian Criminal Justice System\u201d, in W. S. Tarnopolsky, J. Whitman and M. Ouellette, eds., Discrimination in the Law and the Administration of Justice (1993), 231.<\/p>\n

These myths and stereotypes about child and adult complainants are particularly invidious because they comprise part of the fabric of social \u201ccommon sense\u201d in which we are daily immersed.\u00a0 Their pervasiveness, and the subtlety of their operation, create the risk that victims of abuse will be blamed or unjustly discredited in the minds of both judges and jurors<\/u>.<\/p>\n

[49]\u00a0 Similarly, Schulman J, in his report in the Lavoie Inquiry (Commission of Inquiry into the Deaths of Rhonda Lavoie and Roy Lavoie, A Study of Domestic Violence and the Justice System in Manitoba (Manitoba:\u00a0 Department of Justice, 1997)), which examined domestic violence and the justice system in Manitoba, warned of the danger of evaluating the credibility of victims of domestic violence based on uninformed and pre-conceived notions of human behaviour (at p 43)<\/u>:<\/p>\n

Judges and the court system can play a crucial role in interrupting the cycle of violence and preventing further violence.\u00a0 To do so, judges must understand the issues associated with domestic violence.\u00a0 The behaviour of a victim may confuse or mislead someone who does not appreciate the dynamics of an abusive relationship. Victims frequently return to an abusive relationship or ask that criminal charges against an offender be dropped<\/u>.\u00a0 They often fail to enforce a no-contact no-communication condition or a recognizance or probation order or refuse to tell anyone, including police officers, about the abuse.\u00a0 While this behaviour is typical of victims of domestic violence, it may lead an uninformed person to conclude that the abuse did not really occur or was not very significant.<\/p>\n

To ensure that judges do not formulate incorrect and inappropriate assumptions about victims of domestic violence, they must be aware that domestic violence occurs within every socioeconomic and demographic group.\u00a0 Victims do not necessarily fit into specific categories or possess specific characteristics.<\/p>\n

See also R v Lavallee<\/i>, 1990 CanLII 95 (CSC)<\/a>, [1990] 1 SCR 852 at 870-73.<\/p>\n

[50]\u00a0 The law is now well settled that the use of myths and stereotypes has no place in the determination of credibility because such reasoning corrupts and distorts the trial process and may result in an unfair trial<\/u>.\u00a0 As this Court explained in RGB (at para 59):<\/p>\n

[T]he credibility of a witness should be judged on the evidence before the judge, not on stereotypical assumptions.\u00a0 A judge would err in law if there is a sound basis to conclude, on appellate review, that a credibility finding was not based on a proper evidentiary foundation, but rather on inappropriate judicial stereotyping.<\/p>\n

(\u2026)<\/p>\n

[52]\u00a0\u00a0 The accused\u2019s submission that the complainant\u2019s credibility as to her version of events was undermined because it did not conform to some \u201cidealized standard of conduct\u201d (R v CMG<\/i>, 2016 ABQB 368<\/a> at para 60<\/a>) is unsound. I reject it unequivocally.\u00a0 Credibility determinations must be based on the totality of the evidence, not untested assumptions of a victim\u2019s likely behaviour based on myths and stereotypes<\/u>.[41]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[<\/a>76]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Dans l\u2019affaire R. c. A.R.J.D<\/i>, la Cour supr\u00eame confirmait par ailleurs r\u00e9cemment l\u2019erreur de droit d\u00e9coulant de l\u2019appr\u00e9ciation de la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 de la plaignante en la comparant au comportement attendu d\u2019une victime type d\u2019agression sexuelle :<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

[2] \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Nous sommes d\u2019avis de rejeter le pourvoi, essentiellement pour les motifs des juges majoritaires de la Cour d\u2019appel. En prenant en consid\u00e9ration l\u2019absence de preuve que la plaignante aurait cherch\u00e9 \u00e0 \u00e9viter l\u2019appelant<\/u>, le juge du proc\u00e8s a commis l\u2019erreur m\u00eame contre laquelle il s\u2019\u00e9tait mis en garde plus t\u00f4t dans ses motifs : il a appr\u00e9ci\u00e9 la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 de la plaignante uniquement en comparant son comportement \u00e0 celui attendu de la victime type d\u2019agression sexuelle. Il s\u2019agissait l\u00e0 d\u2019une erreur de droit<\/u>. Nous ne voyons rien dans les motifs de la majorit\u00e9, y compris les par. 39 et 41 soulign\u00e9s par la d\u00e9fense, qui tende \u00e0 indiquer le contraire.[42]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Le juge Paciocco de la Cour d\u2019appel de l\u2019Ontario analysait de mani\u00e8re exhaustive la r\u00e8gle interdisant le recours aux st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes en prenant soin de distinguer les st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes de la preuve admissible d\u2019un comportement particulier d\u2019une victime ou d\u2019un agresseur.<\/h2>\n

[78]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Plus r\u00e9cemment dans l\u2019affaire R. v. J.C.<\/em>[44]<\/a>, la juge Paciocco de la Cour d\u2019appel de l\u2019Ontario analysait de mani\u00e8re exhaustive la r\u00e8gle interdisant le recours aux st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes en prenant soin de distinguer les st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes de la preuve admissible d\u2019un comportement particulier d\u2019une victime ou d\u2019un agresseur :<\/p>\n

[63]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 The second relevant, overlapping rule is that factual findings, including determinations of credibility, cannot be based on stereotypical inferences about human behaviour. I will call this \u201cthe rule against stereotypical inferences\u201d. Pursuant to this rule, it is an error of law to rely on stereotypes or erroneous common-sense assumptions about how a sexual offence complainant is expected to act, to either bolster or compromise their credibility:\u00a0Roth<\/em>, at para.\u00a0129;\u00a0R v. A.B.A.<\/em>,\u00a02019\u00a0ONCA\u00a0124,\u00a0145 O.R. (3d) 634<\/a>, at para.\u00a05<\/a>;\u00a0Cepic<\/em>, at para.\u00a014. It is equally wrong to draw inferences from stereotypes about the way accused persons are expected to act: R. v. Quartey,\u00a0<\/em>2018 ABCA 12<\/em><\/a>,\u00a0<\/em>430 D.L.R. (4th) 381<\/em>, at para.\u00a0<\/em>21<\/em><\/a>,\u00a0<\/em>aff\u2019d\u00a02018 SCC 59<\/a>, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 687; and\u00a0see\u00a0Cepic<\/em>, at para.\u00a024.<\/p>\n

[64]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Two points are critical in understanding this rule and ensuring that it does not impede proper judicial reasoning.<\/p>\n

[65]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 First, like the rule against ungrounded common-sense assumptions, the rule against stereotypical inferences does not bar all inferences relating to behaviour that are based on human experience. It only prohibits inferences that are based on stereotype or \u201cprejudicial generalizations\u201d:\u00a0R. v. A.R.D.<\/em>,\u00a02017 ABCA 237<\/a>, 422 D.L.R. (4th) 471, at paras.\u00a06-7<\/a>, aff\u2019d\u00a02018 SCC 6<\/a>, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 218.<\/p>\n

[66]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 For example, it is a myth or stereotype that a complainant would avoid their assailant or change their behaviour towards their assailant after being sexually assaulted, and it is an error to employ such reasoning:\u00a0<\/em>A.R.D.<\/em>, at paras.\u00a057-58<\/a>;\u00a0A.B.A.<\/em>, at paras.\u00a06, 8-10<\/a>;\u00a0R. v. Caesar,\u00a0<\/em>2015 NWTCA 4<\/a>, 588 A.R. 392, at para.\u00a06<\/a>. Similarly, it is a stereotype that women would not behave in a sexually aggressive manner, or that men would be interested in sex. Reasoning that is based on such inferences is not permitted:\u00a0Cepic<\/em>, at paras.\u00a014-16;\u00a0Quartey<\/em>, at para. 21.<\/p>\n

[67]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 By contrast, no stereotype or prejudicial generalization is offended by inferring, where a man drives a resisting woman to a secluded location before touching her sexually, that she did not consent and that he intended to touch her without her consent. Hence, such inferences are appropriate.<\/p>\n

[68]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 The second critical point in understanding the rule against stereotypical inferences is that this rule\u00a0prohibits certain inferences\u00a0from being drawn; it does not prohibit the admission or use of certain kinds of evidence. Professor Lisa Dufraimont makes this point admirably in \u201cMyth, Inference and Evidence in Sexual Assault Trials\u201d (2019) 44:2 Queen\u2019s L. J. 316, at pp. 345-46, 350; and it is reinforced\u00a0in\u00a0<\/em>A.R.D.<\/em>, at paras.\u00a06-8, 62<\/a>; and\u00a0Roth<\/em>, at para.\u00a073.<\/p>\n

[69]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 For this reason, it is not an error to admit and rely upon evidence that could support an impermissible stereotype, if that evidence otherwise has relevance and is not being used to invoke an impermissible stereotype:\u00a0Roth<\/em>, at paras.\u00a0130-38. For example,\u00a0in\u00a0R. v. Kiss<\/em>,\u00a02018\u00a0ONCA\u00a0184<\/a>, at paras.\u00a0101-2<\/a>, evidence that the complainant did not scream for help was admitted, not to support the impermissible stereotypical inference that her failure to do so undermined the credibility of her claim that she was not consenting, but for the permissible purpose of contradicting her testimony that she had screamed to attract attention.<\/p>\n

[70]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 By the same token, it is not an error to arrive at a factual conclusion that may logically reflect a stereotype where that factual conclusion is not drawn from a stereotypical inference but is, instead, based on the evidence. For example, although it is a stereotype that men are interested in sex, it was not an error to infer that the accused male was interested in sex at the time of the alleged assault where that inference was based on evidence:\u00a0Quartey<\/em>, at para. 21. Similarly, in\u00a0R. v. F.B.P.<\/em>,\u00a02019\u00a0ONCA\u00a0157<\/a>, the trial judge was found not to have erred in finding it implausible that the complainant would consent to spontaneous sex on a balcony, potentially in full view of others, because that inference did not rest in stereotypes about the sexual behaviour of women. The inference was based on evidence about the ongoing sexual disinterest the complainant had shown in the accused, and the ready availability of a private bedroom.<\/p>\n

\n

[<\/a>79]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Pour \u00e9tablir l\u2019erreur de droit, il ne suffit pas pour la poursuite de d\u00e9montrer l\u2019usage de st\u00e9r\u00e9otypes. Elle a le fardeau de d\u00e9montrer que cet usage a eu un impact sur la d\u00e9cision, comme le signalait cette Cour dans l\u2019arr\u00eat G\u00e9linas c. R.<\/i> :<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

[6]\u00a0 Pour que son moyen soit retenu, l\u2019appelant doit non seulement \u00e9tablir l\u2019usage d\u2019un st\u00e9r\u00e9otype, mais aussi que celui-ci a eu un impact sur la d\u00e9cision. Conclure \u00e0 la culpabilit\u00e9 d\u2019un accus\u00e9 en se fondant sur des pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s et non sur la preuve constitue une erreur de droit.[45]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

L\u2019article 724(3)e) du Code criminel, qui impose un fardeau hors de tout doute raisonnable, ne trouve application qu\u2019en cas de contestation des faits qui fondent le facteur aggravant.<\/h2>\n

Si la poursuite a le fardeau de prouver les facteurs aggravants hors de tout doute raisonnable, le tribunal peut n\u00e9anmoins inf\u00e9rer de tels facteurs aggravants \u00e0 partir des faits non contest\u00e9s \u00e9tablis hors de tout doute raisonnable devant lui.<\/h2>\n

[104]\u00a0\u00a0 L\u2019appelant plaide que le juge a consid\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00e0 tort l\u2019absence de d\u00e9marche de gestion de comportement de la part de l\u2019appelant comme facteur aggravant sans que la poursuite d\u00e9montre ce fait hors de tout doute raisonnable, tandis que l\u2019accus\u00e9 a t\u00e9moign\u00e9 du fait qu\u2019il a un suivi psychologique hebdomadaire. Ce moyen ne peut \u00eatre retenu.<\/p>\n

[105]\u00a0\u00a0 L\u2019appelant fonde cet argument sur l\u2019article 724(3)<\/a>e<\/em>) du Code criminel<\/a><\/em>[62]<\/sup><\/a> et sur la jurisprudence qu\u2019il interpr\u00e8te pour affirmer que le facteur aggravant doit \u00eatre prouv\u00e9 hors de tout doute raisonnable, soit l\u2019arr\u00eat Ferguson<\/em>, o\u00f9 la Cour supr\u00eame affirme\u00a0:<\/p>\n

[\u2026]<\/p>\n

Pour s\u2019appuyer sur un fait aggravant ou une condamnation ant\u00e9rieure, le juge qui d\u00e9termine la peine doit \u00eatre convaincu hors de tout doute raisonnable de l\u2019existence de ce fait ou de cette condamnation; pour se fonder sur tout autre fait pertinent, il doit \u00eatre convaincu de l\u2019existence de ce fait par une preuve pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rante :<\/u> al. 724(3)<\/a>d) et e); voir aussi R. c. Gardiner<\/em>, 1982 CanLII 30<\/a> (CSC), [1982] 2 R.C.S. 368; R. c. Lawrence<\/em> (1987), 58 C.R. (3d) 71 (H.C. Ont.)<\/span>.\u00a0 Il ressort de cette d\u00e9marche que le juge du proc\u00e8s ne doit s\u2019appuyer que sur les constatations de fait n\u00e9cessaires pour lui permettre d\u2019infliger la peine appropri\u00e9e dans l\u2019affaire dont il est saisi.\u00a0 Il doit d\u2019abord se demander quelles sont les questions pertinentes pour la d\u00e9termination de la peine et, ensuite, faire les constatations de fait n\u00e9cessaires pour trancher ces questions.<\/p>\n

[Soulignement ajout\u00e9]<\/p>\n

[106]\u00a0\u00a0 L\u2019arr\u00eat de principe sur la question du fardeau de preuve, pour d\u00e9montrer un facteur aggravant, demeure l\u2019arr\u00eat R. c.<\/em> Gardiner<\/em> o\u00f9 le juge Dickson affirme que le fardeau varie selon que les faits aggravants soient ou non contest\u00e9s[63]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0:<\/p>\n

\u2026si, lors de l\u2019audition relative \u00e0 la sentence qui suit la d\u00e9claration de culpabilit\u00e9, la poursuite tente de faire la preuve de circonstances aggravantes relatives \u00e0 l\u2019infraction commise et que ces circonstances sont contest\u00e9es, l\u2019obligation impos\u00e9e \u00e0 la poursuite est-elle de faire la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable<\/u>, norme qui sert ordinairement en mati\u00e8re criminelle, ou selon la pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rance des probabilit\u00e9s, une norme de preuve moins stricte?<\/p>\n

[\u2026]<\/p>\n

La poursuite doit prouver toutes les circonstances aggravantes qu\u2019elle invoque et qui ne sont pas vis\u00e9es par cet aveu. Si ces circonstances ne sont pas contest\u00e9es, la proc\u00e9dure peut \u00eatre tr\u00e8s peu formaliste. Si elles le sont, la question doit se r\u00e9gler selon les principes juridiques ordinaires qui r\u00e9gissent les proc\u00e9dures en mati\u00e8re criminelle, notamment le principe portant que tout doute pertinent doit profiter \u00e0 l\u2019accus\u00e9<\/u>. Pour moi, les faits qui justifient la peine ne sont pas moins importants que ceux qui justifient la d\u00e9claration de culpabilit\u00e9; les deux devraient \u00eatre soumis \u00e0 la m\u00eame norme de preuve.<\/p>\n

[Soulignements ajout\u00e9s]<\/p>\n

[107]\u00a0\u00a0 En 2015, la Cour d\u2019appel de la Nouvelle-\u00c9cosse, se penchant \u00e0 son tour sur les articles 723<\/a> et 724<\/a> C.cr<\/a>.<\/em>[64]<\/sup><\/a>,<\/em> expliquait que l\u2019article 724(3)<\/a>e<\/em>) du Code criminel<\/a><\/em>, qui impose un fardeau hors de tout doute raisonnable, ne trouve application qu\u2019en cas de contestation des faits qui fondent le facteur aggravant[65]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0:<\/p>\n

[50]\u00a0\u00a0Respectfully, we think this is a proper statement of the law, which is particularly relevant in the circumstances of this case.\u00a0 Ladue confirms what appears to us to be the clear meaning of s.724(3)<\/a> –\u00a0 the Crown\u2019s obligation to prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt is only triggered by a clear and unequivocal factual dispute<\/u>.\u00a0 Further, there is nothing in the authorities or on a plain reading of the two provisions themselves which suggest that the term \u201cinformation\u201d contained in s.724(1) is intended to convey anything other than the common meaning of that term.\u00a0 As such, the nature and type of \u201cinformation\u201d which a sentencing court may consider, especially where introduced with the consent of both parties, is broad.<\/p>\n

[Soulignement ajout\u00e9]<\/p>\n

[108]\u00a0\u00a0 En 2018, la Cour d\u2019appel du Nouveau-Brunswick en venait \u00e0 une conclusion semblable dans une affaire o\u00f9 l\u2019accus\u00e9 avait plaid\u00e9 coupable. Elle concluait que les faits non contest\u00e9s ont force de preuve et pourront \u00eatre pris en consid\u00e9ration pour inf\u00e9rer hors de tout de raisonnable l\u2019existence d\u2019un facteur aggravant[66]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0:<\/p>\n

Je voudrais toutefois formuler les observations suivantes sur la proc\u00e9dure \u00e0 suivre en audience de d\u00e9termination de la peine lorsqu\u2019un fait aggravant est contest\u00e9, plus particuli\u00e8rement sous le r\u00e9gime du par. 724(1) et de l\u2019al. 724(3)<\/a>e) :<\/p>\n

[\u2026]<\/p>\n

i. un aveu de culpabilit\u00e9 est, en soi, un aveu des \u00e9l\u00e9ments de l\u2019infraction sans plus.<\/p>\n

ii. Si les faits que le minist\u00e8re public souhaite invoquer en tant que faits aggravants ne sont pas contest\u00e9s par l\u2019accus\u00e9, le juge charg\u00e9 de d\u00e9terminer la peine est en droit de les consid\u00e9rer comme prouv\u00e9s<\/u>.<\/span><\/p>\n

iii. Si les faits que le minist\u00e8re public souhaite invoquer en tant que faits aggravants sont contest\u00e9s, la question doit se r\u00e9gler selon les principes ordinaires qui r\u00e9gissent les proc\u00e9dures en mati\u00e8re criminelle; le minist\u00e8re public a donc le fardeau de prouver les faits aggravants contest\u00e9s, et un doute raisonnable, le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant, doit profiter \u00e0 l\u2019accus\u00e9<\/u>.<\/p>\n

iv. Il est permis au juge, sans avoir \u00e0 entendre une preuve compl\u00e9mentaire, d\u2019inf\u00e9rer un \u00e9tat d\u2019esprit contest\u00e9 des faits non contest\u00e9s pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s lors d\u2019une audience de d\u00e9termination de la peine. \u00c9videmment, si un facteur aggravant entre en jeu, les faits non contest\u00e9s doivent raisonnablement autoriser cette inf\u00e9rence hors de tout doute raisonnable<\/u>.<\/p>\n

[Soulignements ajout\u00e9s]<\/p>\n

[109]\u00a0\u00a0 Plus r\u00e9cemment, cette Cour r\u00e9sumait ainsi les r\u00e8gles de preuve au stade de la d\u00e9termination de la preuve[67]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0:<\/p>\n

[271]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Au stade de d\u00e9termination de la peine, il est bien connu que les r\u00e8gles de preuve sont assouplies, que le juge prend connaissance des \u00e9l\u00e9ments de preuve pertinents, et que les d\u00e9terminations portant sur des faits contest\u00e9s se font sur la base de la pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rance de preuve, \u00e0 l\u2019exception des faits aggravants ou des condamnations ant\u00e9rieures<\/u>.<\/p>\n

[Soulignement ajout\u00e9]<\/p>\n

[110]\u00a0\u00a0 L\u2019interpr\u00e9tation propos\u00e9e par la poursuite selon laquelle l\u2019article 724(3)<\/a> du Code criminel<\/a><\/em> ne trouve application qu\u2019en pr\u00e9sence d\u2019une contestation est conforme au texte de l\u2019article et \u00e0 la jurisprudence. Les parties doivent prouver tout fait contest\u00e9 sur la balance des probabilit\u00e9s et, si la poursuite a le fardeau de prouver les facteurs aggravants hors de tout doute raisonnable, le tribunal peut n\u00e9anmoins inf\u00e9rer de tels facteurs aggravants \u00e0 partir des faits non contest\u00e9s \u00e9tablis hors de tout doute raisonnable devant lui[68]<\/a>. Au surplus, la d\u00e9termination des facteurs aggravants ou att\u00e9nuants par le juge de premi\u00e8re instance rel\u00e8ve des faits et commandent la d\u00e9f\u00e9rence, \u00e0 moins d\u2019une erreur manifeste et d\u00e9terminante de sa part[69]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

J.L. c. R., 2021 QCCA 1509 MISE EN GARDE : Ordonnance limitant la publication : Il est interdit de publier ou diffuser de quelque fa\u00e7on que ce soit tout renseignement qui permettrait d\u2019\u00e9tablir l\u2019identit\u00e9 de la victime ou d\u2019un t\u00e9moin (article 486.4(1) C.cr.). Harc\u00e8lement criminelle : Le caract\u00e8re r\u00e9p\u00e9titif de l\u2019acte reproch\u00e9 devra \u00eatre prouv\u00e9 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[476,64,3751,3752,5488,5489],"yst_prominent_words":[669,1046,1062,814,1216,1039,1048,1566,1567,1819,4612,1052,1142,3398],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16627"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16627"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16627\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16627"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16627"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16627"},{"taxonomy":"yst_prominent_words","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/yst_prominent_words?post=16627"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}