{"id":6432,"date":"2013-09-12T02:55:19","date_gmt":"2013-09-12T02:55:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/doyonavocats.ca\/le-credit-de-detention-1-51-nest-pas-exceptionnel\/"},"modified":"2020-09-01T15:33:17","modified_gmt":"2020-09-01T19:33:17","slug":"le-credit-de-detention-1-51-nest-pas-exceptionnel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/le-credit-de-detention-1-51-nest-pas-exceptionnel\/","title":{"rendered":"Le cr\u00e9dit de d\u00e9tention 1.5:1 n\u2019est pas exceptionnel : R. c. Henrico, 2013 QCCA 1431"},"content":{"rendered":"

La Cour d\u2019appel du Qu\u00e9bec dans\u00a0R. c. Henrico<\/i>, 2013 QCCA 1431<\/a> \u2013 tout comme l\u2019avait fait celle de l\u2019Ontario dans Summers<\/i> \u2013 affirme que le cr\u00e9dit de d\u00e9tention ayant pour ratio 1.5:1 n\u2019est pas exceptionnel.<\/p>\n

Voici les passages pertinents :<\/p>\n

[37]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 L\u2019affaire soul\u00e8ve donc les deux questions suivantes\u00a0:<\/p>\n

Premi\u00e8re\u00a0question<\/span>\u00a0:\u00a0aux termes de l\u2019article\u00a0719(3.1)<\/a>\u00a0C.cr.<\/i>, de quelles circonstan\u00adces le juge peut-il tenir compte?<\/p>\n

Deuxi\u00e8me\u00a0question<\/span>\u00a0:\u00a0la juge a-t-elle commis des erreurs manifestes et d\u00e9terminantes dans son analyse de la preuve et des inf\u00e9rences \u00e0 en tirer?<\/p>\n

[…]<\/p>\n

[43] \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00c0 mon avis, il faut donner \u00e0 l\u2019expression \u00ab\u00a0si les circonstances le justifient\u00a0\u00bb une port\u00e9e large et lib\u00e9rale qui permet la prise en compte \u00e0 la fois des conditions objectives de d\u00e9tention offertes durant la p\u00e9riode de d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine et des conditions personnelles au d\u00e9tenu qui lessubit.<\/p>\n

[…]<\/p>\n

[55]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Ainsi, et bien que le juge puisse toujours prendre en compte le temps pass\u00e9 sous garde, l\u2019exercice de sa discr\u00e9tion est dor\u00e9navant assujetti, depuis l\u2019entr\u00e9e en vigueur de la Loi, \u00e0 de nouvelles balises fix\u00e9es par le l\u00e9gislateur\u00a0: (1)\u00a0r\u00e8gle g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, s\u2019il est d\u2019avis qu\u2019il lui faut tenir compte du temps pass\u00e9 en d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine, le juge applique un cr\u00e9dit allou\u00e9 sur la base d\u2019un jour pour chaque jour pass\u00e9 sous garde[21]<\/a>; (2)\u00a0s\u2019il est en pr\u00e9sence de circonstances qui le justifient, et sauf dans les deux cas d\u2019exception \u00e9nonc\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019article\u00a0719(3.1)<\/a>\u00a0C.cr.<\/i>, le juge peut augmenter le ratio du cr\u00e9dit accord\u00e9, mais jamais au\u2011del\u00e0 du maximum fix\u00e9 \u00e0 un jour et demi par jour pass\u00e9 sous garde[22]<\/a>; (3)\u00a0il n\u2019y a plus d\u2019automatisme[23]<\/a>; et (4)\u00a0la transparence s\u2019impose notamment au sujet des raisons pour lesquelles un cr\u00e9dit est accord\u00e9[24]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[…]<\/p>\n

[59]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Dans Summers<\/i>, la juge Cronk de la Cour d\u2019appel de l\u2019Ontario traite \u00e9galement de la question et ses propos sont plus tard endoss\u00e9s par le juge Bielby de la Cour d\u2019appel de l\u2019Alberta dans Johnson<\/i>[27]<\/a>. La juge Cronk \u00e9crit, au paragraphe 66 de ses motifs\u00a0:<\/p>\n

66\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 I note, first, the obvious but important point that s. 719(3.1)<\/a> is silent as to the situations that will justify enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody. As others have observed, the word \u201ccircumstances\u201d in s. 719(3.1)<\/a> is not qualified by any modifying or limiting language. Nor is it defined under the Act. As indicated by Chief Judge Cozens in R. v. Vittrekwa, 2011 YKTC 64 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2011 YKTC 64, 275 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at para. 46, none of the words \u201cexceptional\u201d, \u201cunusual\u201d or \u201cspecial\u201d (nor, I would add, any of the words \u201ccompelling\u201d, \u201cextraordinary\u201d, or \u201crare\u201d) is used in s.\u00a0719(3.1)<\/a> to constrain or limit the circumstances that may justify enhanced credit.[28]<\/a><\/p>\n

[…]<\/p>\n

[70]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Puisque la Loi n\u2019a pas tout chang\u00e9 en mati\u00e8re de cr\u00e9dit pour la d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine, la jurisprudence ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 sa mise en vigueur, qui n\u2019entre pas en conflit avec les nouvelles balises qu\u2019elle comporte, demeure pertinente et les principes qu\u2019elle \u00e9nonce applicables.<\/p>\n

[71]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 De l\u2019arr\u00eat Wust<\/i>[36]<\/a> de la Cour supr\u00eame, je retiens les principes suivants que j\u2019estime pertinents et qui sont applicables en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce malgr\u00e9 les modifications apport\u00e9es par la Loi\u00a0:<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 par l\u2019application du paragraphe\u00a0719(3)<\/a>\u00a0C.cr.<\/i>, la d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine est r\u00e9put\u00e9e faire partie de la peine apr\u00e8s la d\u00e9claration de culpabilit\u00e9 et, en ce sens, elle constitue une peine inflig\u00e9e aux intim\u00e9s apr\u00e8s leur d\u00e9claration de culpabilit\u00e9;<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 les dispositions l\u00e9gislatives qui portent, directement ou indirectement, sur la peine (comme les articles\u00a0719(3)<\/a> et (3.1)<\/a>\u00a0C.cr.<\/i>) s\u2019interpr\u00e8tent d\u2019une mani\u00e8re compatible avec les principes g\u00e9n\u00e9raux de la d\u00e9termination de la peine;<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 l\u2019analyse du cr\u00e9dit pour d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine et des circonstances \u00e0 prendre en compte doit donc se faire en consid\u00e9rant les objectifs et principes \u00e9tablis en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9termination de la peine, conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la partie\u00a0XXIII du Code criminel<\/a><\/i>;<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 le caract\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement p\u00e9nible de la d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine est connu et reconnu;<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 le pouvoir dont dispose le juge de premi\u00e8re instance est un pouvoir\u00a0 discr\u00e9tionnaire qu\u2019il exerce en poursuivant l\u2019objectif d\u2019infliger une \u00ab\u00a0peine juste et appropri\u00e9e, qui prend en compte la situation du d\u00e9linquant et les circonstances particuli\u00e8res de la perp\u00e9tration de l\u2019infraction\u00a0\u00bb;<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 sauf erreur de principe ou conclusions manifestement erron\u00e9es et d\u00e9termi\u00adnantes du juge de premi\u00e8re instance, il est pr\u00e9f\u00e9rable de laisser \u00e0 ce \u00ab\u00a0juge qui d\u00e9termine la peine le soin de calculer cette p\u00e9riode, car c\u2019est encore lui qui est le mieux plac\u00e9 pour appr\u00e9cier soigneusement tous les facteurs permettant d\u2019arr\u00eater la peine appropri\u00e9e, y compris l\u2019opportunit\u00e9 d\u2019accorder une r\u00e9duction pour la p\u00e9riode de d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9sentencielle.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n

[72]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Le principe voulant que le cr\u00e9dit pour la d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine soit d\u00e9termin\u00e9 au cas par cas n\u2019a pas chang\u00e9, bien au contraire. Les paragraphes\u00a0719(3.1)<\/a>, (3.2)<\/a> et (3.3)<\/a>\u00a0C.cr.<\/i> l\u2019illustrent \u00e9loquemment.<\/p>\n

[…]<\/p>\n

[74]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Dans l\u2019affaire Kravchov<\/i>, le juge Kenkel de la Cour de justice de l\u2019Ontario cite plusieurs facteurs qui ont port\u00e9 des juges \u00e0 accorder un cr\u00e9dit augment\u00e9 pour la d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine. \u00c0 mon avis, et sauf dans la mesure o\u00f9 les nouvelles balises de la Loi y font \u00e9chec sp\u00e9cifiquement, ces facteurs demeurent pertinents.<\/p>\n

12\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 In determining whether it is appropriate to give enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, courts have looked at a wide range of factors, mostly related to the circumstances of detention and the effects of that detention on the particular accused. Those factors include:<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 the effect of pre-trial custody on a particular prisoner due to age, infirmity, mental illness R. v. Gray<\/i>, [1995] O.J. No.\u00a0236 (Ont. Gen. Div.), linguistic or cultural isolation R. v. Perrambalam<\/i>, [2001] O.J. No.\u00a03520 (Ont. S.C.J.) R. v. Rajakulasingham<\/i>, [1994] O.J. No.\u00a02357 (Ont. Gen. Div.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 incarceration at a facility that houses primarily men where that has resulted in isolation of a female prisoner R. v. Bennett<\/i>, [1993] O.J. No.\u00a0892 (Ont. C.J.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 lengthy pre-trial custody R. v. Smith<\/i>, [1995] O.J. No.\u00a0214 (Ont. Gen. Div.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 significant pre-trial custody where the accused has never been incarcerated before R. v. Bell<\/i>, [1995] O.J. No.\u00a04533 (Ont. Gen. Div.), R. v. Bennett<\/i>, [1993] O.J. No.\u00a0892 (Ont. C.J.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 the availability of rehabilitative or education programs at the detention centre R. v. Jabbour<\/i>, [2001] O.J. No.\u00a03820 (Ont. S.C.J.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 whether a jail is \u201covercrowded\u201d and engaging in practices such as \u201ctriple bunking\u201d R. v. Jabbour<\/i>, [2001] O.J. No.\u00a03820 (Ont. S.C.J.), R.\u00a0v. Robinson<\/i>, [2001] O.J. No.\u00a05235 (Ont. C.J.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 the frequency of \u201clockdowns\u201d and other measures denying the prisoner exercise and access to areas outside his or her cell R.\u00a0v.\u00a0Jabbour<\/i>, [2001] O.J. No.\u00a03820 (Ont. S.C.J.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 waiver of a preliminary hearing along with conditions of detention R. v. Whittaker<\/i>, [2001] A.J. No.\u00a01356 (Alta. Q.B.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 the prevalence of disease and any other conditions which endanger the health of the prisoner R. v. Poirier<\/i>, [2001] O.J. No.\u00a02320 (Ont. C.J.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 custody during a public service strike where that labour disruption affected the care of the prisoners and prevented their transportation to court R. v. W.C.D<\/i>., [2002] O.J. No.\u00a01623 (Ont. S.C.J.);<\/p>\n

–\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 any unusual delays in the progress of the case attributable to the Crown. [37]<\/a><\/p>\n

[75]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 L\u2019appelante all\u00e8gue que la juge de premi\u00e8re instance commet une erreur de principe en se basant sur des facteurs non pertinents pour d\u00e9terminer si les circonstances justifient un cr\u00e9dit de\u00a01,5:1, des facteurs subjectifs personnels aux intim\u00e9s. Elle plaide que ces facteurs ne sauraient faire partie de l\u2019analyse des circonstances de l\u2019article\u00a0719(3.1)<\/a>\u00a0C.cr.<\/i> Le texte de loi ne soutient pas cette pr\u00e9tention de l\u2019appelante. Comme on le voit des exemples pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment cit\u00e9s, tir\u00e9s de la jurisprudence ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 l\u2019entr\u00e9e en vigueur de la Loi, les tribunaux ont de tout temps admis plusieurs facteurs subjectifs, personnels au d\u00e9tenu concern\u00e9, dans l\u2019\u00e9valuation du cr\u00e9dit \u00e0 accorder pour la d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine. L\u2019expression \u00ab\u00a0si les circonstances le justifient\u00a0\u00bb utilis\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019article\u00a0719(3.1)<\/a>\u00a0C.cr.<\/i> laisse toujours place \u00e0 cette latitude.<\/p>\n

[76]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 L\u2019exercice de discr\u00e9tion auquel doit se livrer le juge de premi\u00e8re instance, aux termes de l\u2019article\u00a0719(3.1)<\/a>\u00a0C.cr.<\/i> (d\u00e9terminer si les circonstances justifient un ratio\u00a01,5:1) est affaire de \u00ab\u00a0cas par cas\u00a0\u00bb (du sur\u2011mesure, plut\u00f4t que du pr\u00eat\u2011\u00e0\u2011porter).<\/p>\n

[77]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Dans le contexte de l\u2019objectif ultime poursuivi \u00ab\u00a0to arrive at a fit and proper sentence\u00a0<\/i>\u00bb (paragraphe\u00a015 de Carvery<\/i>), ce sont les circonstances sp\u00e9cifiques \u00e0 l\u2019accus\u00e9 concern\u00e9, et toutes ces circonstances, qui sont pertinentes.<\/p>\n

[78]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Je fais donc miens les propos suivants de la juge Cronk de la Cour d\u2019appel de l\u2019Ontario dans Summers\u00a0<\/i>:<\/p>\n

32\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 [\u2026] Apart from this statutory provision and cognizant of the inability to antedate a sentence, the courts had also long recognized that fairness compelled consideration on sentencing of time spent in pre-sentence custody. See for example, R. v. Sloan (1947), 87 C.C.C. 198 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7.<\/p>\n

[\u2026]<\/p>\n

35\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court emphasizes that sentencing is an intrinsically and profoundly subjective process<\/span><\/b>. It is also highly case-centric and individualized<\/span><\/b>: R. v. Shropshire, 1995 CanLII 47 (SCC)<\/a>, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 46; R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 82; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 43; R. v. Jacko, 2010 ONCA 452 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2010 ONCA 452, 256 C.C.C. (3d) 113, at paras. 48 and 52. In R. v. Wust, 2000 SCC 18 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2000 SCC 18, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455, at para. 44, the Supreme Court put it this way: \u201c[T]he goal of sentencing is to impose a just and fit sentence, responsive to the facts of the individual offender<\/span><\/b> and the particular circumstances of the commission of the offence.\u201d More recently, in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, LeBel J. stated, at para. 38:<\/p>\n

The determination of a fit sentence is, subject to any specific statutory rules that have survived Charter scrutiny, a highly individualized process<\/span><\/b>. Sentencing judges must have sufficient manoeuvrability to tailor sentences to the circumstances of<\/span><\/b> the particular offence and the particular offender<\/span><\/b>. Appellate courts have recognized the scope of this discretion and granted considerable deference to a judge\u2019s choice of sentence.<\/p>\n

[\u2026]<\/p>\n

95\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 The Act is concerned with one aspect of the sentencing process \u2014 credit for pre-sentence custody. But the provisions of the Act form part of an overall statutory scheme for sentencing and punishment, set out in the Code. The construction of ss. 719(3)<\/a> and (3.1)<\/a>, therefore, must be undertaken in the context of, and in a manner that is harmonious, coherent and consistent with, that overall statutory scheme.<\/p>\n

[\u2026]<\/p>\n

108\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 My seventh, and final, reason for rejecting the narrow interpretation of \u201ccircumstances\u201d contended for by the Crown is a general, but compelling one. The fundamental task of a sentencing judge is to fashion a fit sentence, tailored to the circumstances of the particular offence and the particular offender<\/span><\/b>. The task of appellate courts on appeals against sentence, unless the sentence is one fixed by law, is to consider the fitness of the sentence appealed against and either vary the sentence within the limits prescribed by law for the offence of which the accused was convicted, or dismiss the appeal: s. 687(1) of the Code.<\/p>\n

109\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Thus, during both the sentencing phase of a trial and on appeal against sentence, the focus of the adjudicative inquiry is on the fitness of a sentence in the context of the facts of a specific case<\/span><\/b>. On that essential inquiry, all relevant factors are in play, at all levels of courts, concerning the offence, the offender and the governing principles of sentencing. Once again, if Parliament had intended to circumscribe the long-established roles of sentencing and appellate judges by limiting the circumstances that may bear on the crediting of pre-sentence custody in the manner urged by the Crown, it may fairly be said that this intention would be clearly expressed in affirmative language. Nothing in s. 719(3.1) of the Code reflects this intention.<\/p>\n

[\u2026]<\/p>\n

119\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 I conclude where I began. In my view, properly construed, s. 719(3.1) of the Code permits a sentencing judge to credit pre-sentence custody up to a maximum of 1.5:1 for each day spent in pre-sentence custody where, on consideration of all relevant circumstances<\/span><\/b>, such credit is necessary to achieve a fair and just sanction in accordance with the statutory scheme for sentencing and punishment set out in the Code. On a proper record, the relevant circumstances that may justify this enhanced credit include ineligibility for remission and parole while in remand custody. (Je souligne et j\u2019ajoute le caract\u00e8re gras)<\/p>\n

[79]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 La d\u00e9cision du juge d\u2019accorder un cr\u00e9dit augment\u00e9 doit donc reposer sur une preuve ou sur de l\u2019information communiqu\u00e9e. \u00c0 ce propos, je fais \u00e9galement miennes certaines remarques de mes coll\u00e8gues les juges Steel et Cronk (je ne pourrais dire mieux)\u00a0:<\/p>\n

Extraits de Stonefish<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n

92\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Thus, there are cases where the evidence was presented through viva voce testimony by the accused and prison officials, through affidavits or agreed statements of fact, or simply presented as part of counsel\u2019s submissions (see, for example, Johnson; Desjarlais at para. 21; and R. v. Zhu, 2011 ONCJ 163 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2011 ONCJ 163 (QL)). In R. v. Edwards, 2012 ONCJ 519 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2012 ONCJ 519 (QL), counsel filed letters from prison officials stating how many days the facility had been in lockdown during the offender\u2019s PSC.<\/p>\n

93\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 While the accused must provide some reason for the court to award enhanced credit, the nature of the evidence required should not overly complicate the sentencing process and exacerbate the problems currently facing the prison system. It is not realistic to always require prison officials to attend sentencing hearings in order to provide viva voce evidence of prison conditions or the conduct of the accused while on remand. Instead the emphasis should be on credible and relevant information. Such information could be placed before the court by way of an agreed statement rather than as evidence per se. See, for example, Vittrekwa at para. 70; R. v. I.T.W., 2012 BCPC 305 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2012 BCPC 305 (QL) at para. 67.<\/p>\n

94\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 The bottom line is, as Green J. noted in Johnson (at para. 189):<\/p>\n

\u2026. Further, and here adapting the words of Cole J. in R. v. Duff, 2010 ONCJ 493 (CanLII)<\/a>, [2010 ONCJ 493 (QL)], before acting on such claim [of arduous or oppressive remand conditions] \u201ca sentencing judge should have some evidence that the \u2026 [remand] conditions \u2026 have been particularly onerous\u201d. This may not prove an arduous evidentiary burden, but it is one that need be met where the exercise of judicial discretion replaces the application of settled formulae.[38]<\/a><\/p>\n

Extraits de Summers<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n

121\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Recently, in R. v. Joseph, 2012 BCCA 359 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2012 BCCA 359, 326 B.C.A.C. 312, the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered the nature of the evidence required from an accused who seeks to establish that the circumstances justify enhanced credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody. Justice Harris concluded, at para. 31:<\/p>\n

The [Act] does not explicitly amend the traditional sentencing procedure. There is nothing in s. 719 that amends the procedure by implication. There is no reason in principle to depart from the general rules applicable to all sentencing hearings when a court is asked to decide whether the circumstances justify granting enhanced credit.<\/p>\n

122\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 I agree. The same general principles that govern the admission of evidence and the provision of information to the court for the purpose of sentencing also apply to determining the amount of credit, if any, to be granted for pre-sentence custody under ss. 719(3)<\/a> and (3.1)<\/a>. See Joseph, at paras.\u00a032\u201133.<\/p>\n

123\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Thus, the provision of information relevant to a claim for enhanced credit need not be an onerous task. While formal evidence of an accused\u2019s likely prospects for remission or parole eligibility may be lead at a sentencing hearing, information bearing on these issues (e.g. information regarding an accused\u2019s conduct during detention; an accused\u2019s co-operation with authorities and adherence to prison rules; or an accused\u2019s efforts to advance to trial) may also be furnished to a sentencing judge through counsels\u2019 sentencing submissions, by agreement between the prosecutor and the defence, or otherwise as contemplated under ss. 720-727 of the Code.[39]<\/a><\/p>\n

[…]<\/p>\n

[85]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Depuis l\u2019entr\u00e9e en vigueur de la Loi, la jurisprudence portant sur l\u2019expression \u00ab\u00a0si les circonstances le justifient\u00a0\u00bb de l\u2019article\u00a0719(3.1)<\/a>\u00a0C.cr.<\/i> s\u2019est d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e autour de deux axes\u00a0: le premier compos\u00e9 de cas o\u00f9 les juges prennent appui sur les conditions de d\u00e9tention et sur divers autres \u00e9l\u00e9ments y aff\u00e9rents (c\u2019est l\u2019approche dite qualitative) alors que le second regroupe ceux o\u00f9 les juges prennent en compte l\u2019impact de la d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine sur la lib\u00e9ration conditionnelle de l\u2019accus\u00e9 (c\u2019est l\u2019approche dite quantitative).<\/p>\n

[86]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Au sujet de l\u2019approche qualitative (celle qui nous int\u00e9resse au pr\u00e9sent dossier), dans l\u2019affaire Gosselin<\/i>, le juge Lavergne de la Cour du Qu\u00e9bec rapporte les exemples suivants\u00a0:<\/p>\n

[49]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Ainsi le d\u00e9lai \u00e9coul\u00e9 entre le plaidoyer de culpabilit\u00e9 et la d\u00e9termination de la peine [R. c. Abubeker, <\/i>2011 ONCJ 337], l\u2019indisponibilit\u00e9 du tribunal pour raison de maladie [R. c. Payne<\/i>, 2011 CanLII 4400 (NL PC)<\/a>, 2011 CanLII 4400 (NLPC)], l\u2019\u00e9loignement de la famille du d\u00e9tenu [R. c. Campbell<\/i>, 2010 ONSC 6973 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2010 ONSC 6973; voir aussi R. c. Guo, <\/i>2011 QCCQ 10469 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2011 QCCQ 10469], l\u2019impossibilit\u00e9 financi\u00e8re du d\u00e9tenu de verser la caution exig\u00e9e et les conditions difficiles repr\u00e9sentent [R. c. J.B.,<\/i> 2011 BCPC 158 (CanLII)<\/a>, 2011 BCPC 158] autant de circonstances dont les tribunaux ont tenu compte pour accorder un cr\u00e9dit d\u2019un jour et demi.[40]<\/a><\/p>\n

[87]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Ces d\u00e9cisions cit\u00e9es par le juge Lavergne sont rendues en fonction de la Loi, mais comme on peut le constater, les facteurs pris en compte pour justifier un ratio de\u00a01,5:1 ne sont pas nouveaux et demeurent similaires \u00e0 ceux qui, traditionnellement, avaient men\u00e9 les tribunaux \u00e0 octroyer un cr\u00e9dit de\u00a02:1, telle la rigueur habituelle des conditions de d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine[41]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[88]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 Cela dit, et bien que plusieurs juges aient octroy\u00e9 un cr\u00e9dit de\u00a01,5:1 en raison des conditions difficiles de la d\u00e9tention pr\u00e9alable au prononc\u00e9 de la peine[42]<\/a>, d\u2019autres ont refus\u00e9 de le faire, notamment lorsque les conditions de d\u00e9tentions ne sortaient pas de l\u2019ordinaire, \u00e0 leur avis, ou lorsque la preuve n\u2019\u00e9tait constitu\u00e9e que de simples all\u00e9gations[43]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u00c0 noter que Plusieurs cours d\u2019appel du pays ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 eu l\u2019occasion d\u2019examiner les modifications apport\u00e9es par la Loi, sous un angle ou un autre. \u00c0 ce jour, la Cour supr\u00eame du Canada ne s\u2019est pas prononc\u00e9e, mais elle a accord\u00e9 une permission d\u2019appeler dans l\u2019affaire Carvery<\/i><\/a>.<\/b><\/p>\n

\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La Cour d\u2019appel du Qu\u00e9bec dans\u00a0R. c. Henrico, 2013 QCCA 1431 \u2013 tout comme l\u2019avait fait celle de l\u2019Ontario dans Summers \u2013 affirme que le cr\u00e9dit de d\u00e9tention ayant pour ratio 1.5:1 n\u2019est pas exceptionnel. Voici les passages pertinents : [37]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 L\u2019affaire soul\u00e8ve donc les deux questions suivantes\u00a0: Premi\u00e8re\u00a0question\u00a0:\u00a0aux termes de l\u2019article\u00a0719(3.1)\u00a0C.cr., de […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":15248,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[120],"tags":[131,191],"yst_prominent_words":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6432"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6432"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6432\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15248"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6432"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6432"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6432"},{"taxonomy":"yst_prominent_words","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/yst_prominent_words?post=6432"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}