{"id":8905,"date":"2018-03-10T13:16:21","date_gmt":"2018-03-10T18:16:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/?p=8905"},"modified":"2019-07-28T10:32:09","modified_gmt":"2019-07-28T14:32:09","slug":"the-voir-dire-testimony-of-an-accused-is-subject-to-constitutional-protection-against-self-incrimination-pursuant-to-section-13-of-the-charter","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/the-voir-dire-testimony-of-an-accused-is-subject-to-constitutional-protection-against-self-incrimination-pursuant-to-section-13-of-the-charter\/","title":{"rendered":"The voir dire testimony of an accused is subject to constitutional protection against self-incrimination pursuant to section 13 of the Charter : R. v, Cochrane, 2018 ABCA 80"},"content":{"rendered":"

R v Cochrane, 2018 ABCA 80<\/a><\/p>\n

La Cour d’appel de l’Alberta rappelle que le t\u00e9moignage de l’accus\u00e9 dans le cadre d’un voir-dire<\/a> est couvert par la protection contre l’auto-incrimination pr\u00e9vue \u00e0 l’article 13 de la Charte canadienne.\u00a0Le t\u00e9moignage offert par l’accus\u00e9 dans le cadre d’un voir-dire ne peut servir \u00e0 la Couronne pour \u00e9tablir la culpabilit\u00e9 et celle-ci ne peut en profiter pour contre-interroger sur des questions qui sortent du cadre du voir-dire.\u00a0De plus, lorsque les parties s’entendent pour proc\u00e9der \u00e0 un voir-dire et au proc\u00e8s sur le fond de fa\u00e7on simultan\u00e9e, les r\u00e8gles doivent \u00eatre clairement pr\u00e9\u00e9tablies, notamment quant \u00e0 la nature exacte de la preuve qui sera vers\u00e9e au fond :<\/h2>\n

[18]\u00a0 The\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0testimony of an accused is subject to constitutional protection against self-incrimination pursuant to section 13 of the\u00a0Charter<\/em>. When the accused testifies on a\u00a0voir dire<\/em>, his testimony cannot later be used as evidence of guilt at trial:\u00a0R v Darrach<\/em>,\u00a02000 SCC 46\u00a0(CanLII)<\/a>\u00a0at para 66,\u00a0[2000] 2 SCR 443:<\/p>\n

Furthermore, Dickson J., in the pre-Charter context, held that \u201c[e]vidence on the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0cannot be used in the trial itself\u201d (Erven, supra, at p. 932). Although this Court has not specifically ruled on whether s. 13 of the Charter protects an accused against self-incrimination on a\u00a0voir dire<\/em>, I am of the opinion that it does (as the Superior Court of Quebec found in\u00a0R v Tarafa<\/em>,\u00a0[1990] RJQ 427, at p 429). Section 13 provides that:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    This privilege against self-incrimination applies because a\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0is an \u201cother proceeding\u201d within the meaning of s. 13. In\u00a0Dubois v The Queen<\/em>,\u00a01985 CanLII 10 (SCC)<\/a>,\u00a0[1985] 2 SCR 350, at p. 386, McIntyre J. (in dissent, but the only one to address this issue) found that<\/p>\n

    [t]he\u00a0voir dire\u00a0<\/em>is clearly another proceeding. Its purpose is not to resolve any issue raised in the charge but merely to determine what may be introduced into the proceedings for that purpose. After the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0the evidence found to be properly admissible in the proceedings is admitted and thereafter forms part of the proceedings. That which is excluded never becomes a part.<\/p>\n

    This is true of the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0under s. 276. Its purpose is to enable the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence. The\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0is not itself part of the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. When the accused testifies on a\u00a0voir dire<\/em>, the protection of s. 13 means that his testimony cannot later be used as evidence of guilt at trial. It was established in\u00a0R v Kuldip<\/em>,\u00a01990 CanLII 64 (SCC)<\/a>,\u00a0[1990] 3 SCR 618, that an accused\u2019s testimony from a previous trial on the same charge can be used by the Crown at the retrial only to impeach his credibility, and not as evidence of guilt. In\u00a0Kuldip<\/em>, at p. 636, Lamer C.J. found that using such a prior inconsistent statement for its truth to incriminate the accused is forbidden by s. 13, but that<\/p>\n

    s.13 does not preclude the use of previous testimony during a subsequent cross-examination if the sole purpose of that cross-examination is to challenge the credibility of an accused who has chosen to testify in the second proceedings.<\/p>\n

    [19]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0The Crown is not permitted to use the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0as \u201ca forum for unfair questioning of the accused\u201d and must confine cross-examination to what is necessary to determine the issues on the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>:\u00a0ibid<\/em>\u00a0at para 64. Inconsistencies between the testimony of an accused on the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0and trial can be used to impugn credibility but not to establish culpability:\u00a0ibid<\/em>\u00a0at para 67.<\/p>\n

    […]<\/p>\n

    [23]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0Use of a blended\u00a0voir dire\u00a0<\/em>is an important tool to increase the efficiency of the trial process by avoiding the unnecessary duplication of witness testimony. However, it must be conducted in a fashion that does not detrimentally affect the rights of an accused person. Before embarking on a blended\u00a0voir dire<\/em>, counsel and the court should have a clear understanding of the procedure to be followed, the nature of the evidence that will be adduced and the use to be made of that evidence following any rulings. This is particularly the case whenever the accused testifies in the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0or when the accused is self-represented. For example, will evidence called in the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0automatically become evidence at trial, or will an application to do so be required? It the accused elects to testify in the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>, will that evidence become evidence in the trial, having regard to the accused\u2019s section 13\u00a0Charter<\/em>\u00a0right against self-incrimination?<\/p>\n

    [24]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0See also\u00a0R v Mason<\/em>, 2015 NLTD(G) 93 at paras 32-33, 1149 APR 231 and at para 90 (with emphasis added):<\/p>\n

    I simply repeat my suggestion that all parties and the trial judge ensure that they are of one mind, at the outset of the proceeding, on the parameters of the proceeding, or any part of it,\u00a0with particular reference to the use of evidence for the purpose of establishing elements of the offence and to the status of any evidence that may be given by an accused during a proceeding characterized as a blended\u00a0voir dire<\/em>.<\/u><\/p>\n

    [25]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0In summary, a trial judge must ensure that each party consents to the blended\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0procedure and its terms, particularly as it relates to\u00a0voir dire<\/em>evidence given by the accused and the use to which that evidence can be put following any rulings. The examination and cross-examination of an accused on a\u00a0voir dire<\/em>\u00a0is generally restricted to those matters at issue on the\u00a0voir dire<\/em>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    R v Cochrane, 2018 ABCA 80 La Cour d’appel de l’Alberta rappelle que le t\u00e9moignage de l’accus\u00e9 dans le cadre d’un voir-dire est couvert par la protection contre l’auto-incrimination pr\u00e9vue \u00e0 l’article 13 de la Charte canadienne.\u00a0Le t\u00e9moignage offert par l’accus\u00e9 dans le cadre d’un voir-dire ne peut servir \u00e0 la Couronne pour \u00e9tablir la […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"yst_prominent_words":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8905"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8905"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8905\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8905"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8905"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8905"},{"taxonomy":"yst_prominent_words","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/yst_prominent_words?post=8905"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}