{"id":8977,"date":"2018-03-16T15:58:18","date_gmt":"2018-03-16T19:58:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/?p=8977"},"modified":"2019-07-28T10:27:49","modified_gmt":"2019-07-28T14:27:49","slug":"le-juge-qui-ordonne-un-dedommagement-en-vertu-de-lart-738-c-cr-doit-tenir-compte-de-la-capacite-de-payer-du-delinquant","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/le-juge-qui-ordonne-un-dedommagement-en-vertu-de-lart-738-c-cr-doit-tenir-compte-de-la-capacite-de-payer-du-delinquant\/","title":{"rendered":"Le juge qui ordonne un d\u00e9dommagement en vertu de l’art. 738 C.cr. doit notamment tenir compte de la capacit\u00e9 de payer du d\u00e9linquant : R. v Kelly, 2018 NSCA 24"},"content":{"rendered":"

R. v Kelly, 2018 NSCA 24<\/a><\/p>\n

La Cour d’appel de la Nouvelle-\u00c9cosse rappelle l’importance des ordonnances de d\u00e9dommagement<\/a> dans le processus de d\u00e9termination de la peine. Toutefois, la d\u00e9cision discr\u00e9tionnaire d’un juge d’accorder une telle ordonnance doit r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 des crit\u00e8res bien \u00e9tablis :<\/h2>\n

<\/p>\n

[<\/a>29]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 As traced by Chief Justice Laskin in R. v. Zelensky<\/i>, supra<\/i>, the discretion to order compensation as part of the sentencing process has been in the Criminal Code<\/a><\/i> since its inception.\u00a0 A stand-alone restitution order fulfills a number of purposes.\u00a0 It serves as a vehicle, in appropriate circumstances, to acknowledge the loss caused by the commission of the offence.\u00a0 The order survives bankruptcy so that the offender, as much as the law can do, will not be able to personally benefit from the commission of the offence.\u00a0 People who may be tempted to commit an offence will know, crime does not pay.\u00a0 The victim will be saved the additional expense of being forced to pursue a remedy in the civil courts for the loss they suffered.<\/p>\n

[<\/a>30]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Labrosse J.A., for the Court in R. v. Devgan<\/i> (1999), 1999 CanLII 2412 (ON CA)<\/a>, 121 O.A.C. 265<\/span><\/span> consolidated the relevant factors that should guide a court\u2019s discretion in relation to a restitution order:<\/p>\n

[26]\u00a0 In Zelensky<\/i>, Laskin C.J. identified certain objectives and factors that relate to the application of s. 725(1). These considerations have been expanded upon in subsequent cases. Below, I have consolidated these objectives and factors, all of which are relevant to the issue of what constitutes a proper exercise of discretion for the purpose of s. 725(1).<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0 An order for compensation should be made with restraint and caution.<\/strong><\/p>\n

2. \u00a0The concept of compensation is essential to the sentencing process:<\/strong><\/p>\n

(i)\u00a0 it emphasizes the sanction imposed upon the offender;<\/strong><\/p>\n

(ii)\u00a0 it makes the accused responsible for making restitution to the victim;<\/strong><\/p>\n

(iii)\u00a0 it prevents the accused from profiting from crime; and<\/strong><\/p>\n

(iv) \u00a0it provides a convenient, rapid and inexpensive means of recovery for the victim.<\/strong><\/p>\n

3.\u00a0 A sentencing judge should consider:<\/strong><\/p>\n

(i)\u00a0 the purpose of the aggrieved person in invoking s. 725(1);<\/strong><\/p>\n

(ii)\u00a0 whether civil proceedings have been initiated and are being pursued; and<\/strong><\/p>\n

(iii)\u00a0 the means of the offender.<\/strong><\/p>\n

4.\u00a0 A compensation order should not be used as a substitute for civil proceedings. Parliament did not intend that compensation orders would displace the civil remedies necessary to ensure full compensation to victims.<\/strong><\/p>\n

5.\u00a0 A compensation order is not the appropriate mechanism to unravel involved commercial transactions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

6.\u00a0 A compensation order should not be granted when it would require the criminal court to interpret written documents to determine the amount of money sought through the order. The loss should be capable of ready calculation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

7.\u00a0 A compensation order should not be granted if the effect of provincial legislation would have to be considered in order to determine what order should be made.<\/strong><\/p>\n

8.\u00a0 Any serious contest on legal or factual issues should signal a denial of recourse to an order.<\/strong><\/p>\n

9.\u00a0 Double recovery can be prevented by the jurisdiction of the civil courts to require proper accounting of all sums recovered.<\/strong><\/p>\n

10.\u00a0 A compensation order may be appropriate where a related civil judgment has been rendered unenforceable as a result of bankruptcy.<\/strong><\/p>\n

[31<\/a>]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Labrosse J.A. observed that the considerations he identified were not exhaustive, nor were any one of them determinative.\u00a0 Much would depend on the circumstances of each case:<\/p>\n

[27]\u00a0 It is in light of these considerations that an exercise of discretion under s. 725(1) must be assessed. None of these considerations by themselves are determinative of whether a compensation order should be granted. The weight to be given to individual considerations will depend on the circumstances of each case. Nor is the preceding list intended to be exhaustive. Indeed, other relevant considerations may arise in future cases.<\/p>\n

[<\/a>32]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 These principles have been consistently applied (see for example: R. v. Nanos<\/i>, 2013 BCCA 339 (CanLII)<\/span><\/a><\/span>; R. v. Fast-Carlson<\/i>, 2015 SKCA 86; R. v. Biegus<\/i> (1999), 1999 CanLII 3815 (ON CA)<\/a>, 127 O.A.C. 239<\/span><\/span>; R. v. Castro<\/i>, 2010 ONCA 718 (CanLII)<\/span><\/a><\/span>).<\/p>\n

[<\/a>33]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Like many aspects of sentence, the circumstances of the offence and of the offender can engage conflicting principles when it comes to restitution orders.\u00a0 Relevant to this case was the acknowledged minimal capacity of Ms. Kelly to be able to pay the requested restitution order.<\/p>\n

[<\/a>34]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Ms. Kelly was 52 years of age.\u00a0 She had no job and was experiencing health issues.\u00a0 She had just recently started running a small B&B, which had yet to break even.\u00a0 She had significant debt with no ability to raise further funds.<\/p>\n

[<\/a>35]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 It is well accepted that if an offender has no present or realistic foreseeable ability to pay a stand-alone restitution order, making such an order may interfere with the offender\u2019s rehabilitation, justifying its refusal or reduction from the full amount of the loss (R. v. Siemens<\/i> (1999), 1999 CanLII 18651 (MB CA)<\/a>, 138 Man.R. (2d) 90 (C.A.)<\/span><\/span>; R. v. Spellacy<\/i> (1995), 1995 CanLII 9898 (NL CA)<\/a>, 131 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 127 (Nfld. C.A.)<\/span><\/span>; R. v. Ali<\/i> (1997), 1997 CanLII 2655 (BC CA)<\/a>, 98 B.C.A.C. 239<\/span><\/span>; R. v. Popert<\/i>, 2010 ONCA 89 (CanLII)<\/span><\/a><\/span>; R. v. Fast-Carlson<\/i>, supra<\/i>).<\/p>\n

[…]<\/p>\n

[<\/a>52]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 The judge properly observed that a restitution order is not simply an ancillary order, but forms part of the sentence and must be included when considering the totality of the sentence.\u00a0 However, with respect to the role that ability to pay plays, she asserted that it was not determinative and paramount consideration should be given to the victims of fraudulent transactions.\u00a0 She said this:<\/p>\n

[28]\u00a0 The ability of the accused to pay, and even the future ability to pay is not the determinative factor in whether restitution is ordered by the court, and paramount consideration should be given to the victims of fraudulent transactions, see R. v. Fitzgibbon<\/i>, 1990 CanLII 102 (SCC)<\/a>, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1005<\/span><\/span>, also R. v. Yates<\/i> (2002), 2002 BCCA 583 (CanLII)<\/a>, 169 C.C.C. (3d) 506 (B.C.C.A.)<\/span><\/span>.\u00a0 Section 739.1 of the Code<\/i>also states that \u201cthe offender\u2019s financial means of ability to pay does not prevent the court from making an order under section 738<\/a> or 739<\/a>\u201d.<\/p>\n

[<\/a>53]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 There are certainly some circumstances where patent inability to pay may not deflect a restitution order.\u00a0 Cases where monies or property have been obtained by an offender in breach of trust stand out (see: R. v. Fitzgibbon<\/i>, 1990 CanLII 102 (SCC)<\/a>, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1005<\/span><\/span>; R. v. Scherer<\/i> (1984), 5 O.A.C. 297<\/span><\/span> (leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1984] S.C.C.A. No. 29), both where lawyers committed egregious breaches of trust).\u00a0 As well as where monies have been taken and cannot be accounted for.<\/p>\n

[<\/a>54]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Yates<\/i>, cited by the trial judge above, was not a breach of trust case.\u00a0 The offender committed welfare fraud.\u00a0 The trial judge imposed a restitution order on an offender who had substantial equity in her home.\u00a0 The Court of Appeal upheld the order on the basis of deference.<\/p>\n

[<\/a>55]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 Other than referring to the general concept of Ms. Kelly\u2019s doubtful ability to pay as a factor, the trial judge made no further comment on it.\u00a0 She dismissed it as unimportant, because of the paramount consideration for the victim of the fraudulent transactions.\u00a0 With respect, the failure to appropriately consider the offender\u2019s patent inability to pay such a restitution order reflects legal error.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

R. v Kelly, 2018 NSCA 24 La Cour d’appel de la Nouvelle-\u00c9cosse rappelle l’importance des ordonnances de d\u00e9dommagement dans le processus de d\u00e9termination de la peine. Toutefois, la d\u00e9cision discr\u00e9tionnaire d’un juge d’accorder une telle ordonnance doit r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 des crit\u00e8res bien \u00e9tablis :<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"yst_prominent_words":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8977"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8977"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8977\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8977"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8977"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8977"},{"taxonomy":"yst_prominent_words","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.doyonavocats.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/yst_prominent_words?post=8977"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}