Although I agree with the principle of law that the sufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons must be assessed within this context, “[t]his exercise is not an invitation to appellate courts to engage in a reassessment of aspects of the case not resolved by the trial judge. Where the trial judge’s reasoning is not apparent from the reasons or the record, as in the instant case, the appeal court ought not to substitute its own analysis for that of the trial judge”: R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 32. I am not convinced that in this case the trial judge’s reasoning was apparent enough in the context of the record for it to be discernable to this court without this court having to reassess the case itself and substitute its own analysis. There may be an implicit route available from the trial judge’s explicit factual findings at para. 26 to a finding of the appellant’s guilt, but “it is not appropriate for this court to attempt to discern that route and explain it”: R. v. Capano, 2014 ONCA 599 (CanLII), 313 C.C.C. (3d) 135, at para. 74.