Identification evidence and the Sophonow Report
[12] The second ground of appeal can be dismissed summarily. The appellant submits that the trial judge should have rejected the identification evidence, because the photographic line-up did not comply with the standards recommended in the Sophonow Report.[6]
[13] There is no principle of positive law in Canada that recommendations in the report of a commission of inquiry have the force of law. A judge who does not follow them commits no error by that fact alone that warrants intervention by an appellate court. The Sophonow Report is one among several reports that offer guidelines on identification procedures.[7] The jurisprudence is clear that these recommendations are not legally binding in Quebec or anywhere else. They seek to improve investigative practices involving eyewitness identification by identifying best practices. It does not follow that identification evidence obtained in a manner that differs from these recommendations is inadmissible.[8]The probative value of identification evidence is a question of weight. Justice Vauclair describes the utility of advisory recommendations in Joseph:
[41] L’appelant avance que la parade d’identification ne rencontre pas en tout point les recommandations du Rapport Sophonow. C’est vrai. Ce rapport, fort pertinent et d’une grande importance, formule des observations fondamentales sur les dangers de la preuve d’identification et suggère des moyens pour les contrer. […] Toutefois, encore récemment dans l’arrêt Pelletier, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario rappelait que les recommandations du rapport n’établissaient ni une procédure obligatoire ni un préalable à l’admissibilité d’une preuve de parade photographique.
[42] Dans l’arrêt Beaulieu, la Cour s’est largement inspirée des propositions faites par diverses commissions sur la preuve d’identification pour en mesurer le caractère équitable. Bien que la Cour fût divisée sur le résultat, elle constate l’importance d’un processus rigoureux inspiré des meilleures pratiques sans toutefois en faire une exigence gouvernant l’admissibilité de la preuve. Dans la mesure où l’appelant invite spécifiquement la Cour à le faire, je suis d’avis qu’il n’y pas lieu de créer une telle exigence, tout en rappelant qu’une procédure d’identification qui ne suit pas les meilleures pratiques est plus susceptible d’interpeller l’intervention des tribunaux d’appel.[9]
The second ground is without merit.
The frailties of eyewitness identification are notorious
[14] The frailties of eyewitness identification are notorious.[10] Indeed, it is now a truism and a commonplace to say that the frailties of identification evidence are notorious. In this case the direct evidence of the eyewitness is unreliable and cannot prove identification. The indirect evidence is perhaps consistent with the eyewitness’s evidence but it does not confirm or corroborate it. Taken alone, the circumstantial evidence in no way meets the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt or even any lesser standard of persuasion. This evidence could only prove identification if the sole reasonable inference, beyond reasonable doubt, is that the robber was Mr. Daoust. This is the standard set by the Supreme Court.[11] This is not the only reasonable inference from the evidence of identification adduced in this case. It is some evidence that Mr. Daoust might have some characteristics similar to those of the robber but it is far from proof that Mr. Daoust was the robber in the pharmacy on 20 November 2012. Taken together, the direct and circumstantial evidence support the possibility, perhaps even the probability, that Mr. Daoust was the robber; but it cannot support proof of identification beyond reasonable doubt. A finding of guilt on this basis is unreasonable.