First, the trial judge’s credibility findings are owed significant deference on appeal. They should not be interfered with unlessthey “cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence”: R. v. P.(R.), 2012 SCC 22 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 746; and R. v. Burke, 1996 CanLII 229 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 474, at para. 7.
 Second, significant testimonial inconsistencies should be addressed because, as the Supreme Court noted in R. v. Gagnon,2006 SCC 17 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 621, at para. 21, the accused is entitled to know “why the trial judge is left with no reasonable doubt”. However, a trial judge is not required to refer to or resolve every inconsistency raised by the defence in the course of his or her reasons: R. v. R.(C.), 2010 ONCA 176 (CanLII), 260 O.A.C. 52, at para. 48.
 Third, an appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s findings of credibility if the core of the complainant’s allegations against an appellant remain largely intact on a review of the entirety of the evidence: R. v. Roy, 2017 ONCA 30 (CanLII), at para. 14; R. v. Barua, 2014 ONCA 34 (CanLII), 315 O.A.C. 83, at paras. 7-8; and R. v. Marleau (2005), 2005 CanLII 8667 (ON CA), 197 O.A.C. 29 (C.A.), at para. 7.