La communication de la preuve et les fruits de l’enquête
La Cour supérieure se pense sur la notion de fruits de l’enquête en matière d’alcool au volant.
R. c. Paradis, 2016 QCCS 115 :
ANALYSE ET DÉCISION
[23] Le Tribunal ne siège pas ici en appel de la décision de l’intimée (pièce R-8). Il doit plutôt exercer son pouvoir de contrôle et de surveillance dans le cadre de la requête en certiorari présentée par la requérante.
[24] Traitant des motifs d’ouverture au certiorari, les auteurs Béliveau et Vauclair[4], citant l’arrêt Cunningham[5], s’expriment ainsi :
- Dans le cadre d’un recours en certiorariou autre recours apparenté, une cour supérieure peut, sauf existence d’une clause privative, intervenir si le tribunal inférieur a agi sans compétence ou a commis une erreur de droit manifeste à la face du dossier. […]
[25] Considérant qu’un déni de justice peut soulever une question de compétence pouvant justifier le recours au certiorari, notre Cour d’appel, dans l’affaire Tessier[6], s’exprime ainsi :
[4] Dans l’arrêt Potma, la Cour d’Appel d’Ontario a certes affirmé qu’un déni de justice soulève une question de compétence pouvant justifier le recours au certiorari; par ailleurs, la Cour a ajouté que n’étant pas souhaitable d’interrompre les procès criminels par des attaques contre des jugements interlocutoires qui concernent l’administration de la preuve, les cas qui pourront justifier ces interruptions seront exceptionnels. Au surplus, comme la Cour Suprême du Canada l’a affirmé dans R. c. Mills, 1986 CanLII 17 (CSC), [1986] 1 R.C.S. 863, même une violation d’un droit garanti par la Charte n’entraîne pas en soi une erreur de compétence (p. 964, 965 et 972). Enfin, on conviendra qu’un jugement refusant ou accordant une divulgation de preuve, par le biais du par. 24(1) de la Charte, n’est pas sujet à appel.
[5] En l’espèce, le débat en Cour supérieure origine du refus du juge du procès d’ordonner la divulgation de ces éléments de preuve mais surtout de la conclusion de ce dernier que l’accusé n’avait pas « démontré que la non-divulgation des éléments requis par lui nuira à sa possibilité de présenter une défense pleine et entière, ou aura un effet défavorable sur cette possibilité. ». Comme la Cour suprême l’a affirmé dans R. c. Egger, 1993 CanLII 98 (CSC), [1993] 2 R.C.S. 451, le juge du procès qui effectue un contrôle des décisions du ministère public en matière de divulgation de preuve doit déterminer si l’accusé peut raisonnablement utiliser la communication des renseignements pour réfuter la preuve et les arguments du ministère public, pour présenter un moyen de défense ou autrement pour parvenir à une décision susceptible d’avoir un effet sur le déroulement de la défense comme, par exemple, de présenter ou non une preuve.
(Le Tribunal souligne)
[26] Dans l’affaire Black[7], une décision de la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta, dont la demande de permission d’en appeler à la Cour suprême a été rejetée, on a reconnu au ministère public l’accès au certiorari lorsqu’il y a excès de compétence ou erreur de droit manifeste eu égard au dossier.
[27] Rien dans la décision de l’intimée ne laisse voir sur quelle base elle s’appuie pour prétendre que le DPCP rejette du revers de la main et traite avec désinvolture la demande de divulgation supplémentaire de preuve faite par la mise en cause, pas plus que l’on y retrouve en quoi la défense a démontré la pertinence vraisemblable des renseignements demandés, et ce, afin d’éviter que l’exercice ne devienne qu’une vaste expédition de pêche.
[28] En l’espèce, les renseignements entrant dans la catégorie des « fruits de l’enquête » ont déjà été communiqués à la mise en cause suite à sa comparution, alors que les renseignements supplémentaires demandés par cette dernière ne sont pas des « fruits de l’enquête ».
[29] Dans l’affaire Jackson[8], décision rendue le 2 décembre 2015, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario résume ainsi l’état du droit en matière de communication de la preuve par la poursuite dans une affaire de capacité de conduire avec les facultés affaiblies :
[80] For the purposes of first party or Stinchcombe disclosure, the term “the Crown” refers to the prosecuting Crown only, not to all Crown entities, federal and provincial. All other Crown entities, including the police, are third parties: Quesnelle, at para. 11; McNeil, at para. 22. Apart from the police duty to supply the prosecuting Crown with the fruits of the investigation, records in the hands of third parties, including the police and other Crown entities, are generally not subject to the Stinchcombe disclosure rules: Quesnelle, at para. 11; McNeil, at para. 25.
[81] The assimilation of the police and Crown as a single entity for disclosure purposes is narrowly confined. Apart from the police duty to disclose to the Crown the fruits of the investigation, the two are unquestionably separate and independent entities, not only in fact but also in law. The police investigate. The Crown decides whether, what, whom and how to prosecute: McNeil, at paras. 23, 25. Production of criminal investigation files involving third parties, at least as a general rule, falls to be determined on an O’Connor application. This is so at least in the absence of a nexus between the third party and subject investigation: McNeil, at para. 25.
[82] The Stinchcombe disclosure regime extends only to material relating to the accused’s case in the possession or control of the prosecuting Crown entity. This material is commonly described as the “fruits of the investigation”, that is to say, material gathered during the investigation of the offence with which the accused is charged: McNeil, at para. 23. Relevant information includes not only information related to those matters the Crown intends to adduce in evidence against the accused, but also any information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it may assist the accused in the exercise of the right to make full answer and defence: McNeil, at para. 17; Stinchcombe, at pp. 343-44.
[30] C’est donc dire que contrairement aux prétentions de la mise en cause, la notion de « fruits de l’enquête » n’est pas aussi généreuse qu’elle le prétend. Il faut en retenir qu’aux fins de la communication de la preuve, la Couronne s’entend uniquement du poursuivant et non des autres entités fédérales, provinciales ou voire même des tiers.
[31] C’est donc dire que les renseignements entre les mains de tiers, incluant la police et les autres entités étatiques, ne peuvent généralement pas faire l’objet d’une divulgation de type Stinchcombe[9].
[32] Quant à la communication de renseignements entre les mains d’un tiers étranger au litige, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario[10] mentionne ce qui suit :
[83] A separate disclosure/production scheme exists for records and information in the hands of third parties, strangers to the litigation. This scarcely surprises. After all, third parties are under no obligation and have no duty to assist the parties in litigation or to disclose information to them: O’Connor, at para. 102.
[84] The third party scheme involves two steps or stages. It is initiated by service of a subpoena duces tecum on the third party record-holder, as well as a notice of application and supporting material on the record holder and prosecuting authority: O’Connor, at para. 134. The purpose of the subpoena duces tecum is to have the material requested brought to the trial judge who will determine whether and to what extent the material will be produced. The application sets out the grounds upon which production is sought. The supporting material seeks to establish the relevance of the material to an issue at trial including:
- the unfolding of the narrative;
- the credibility of a witness;
iii. the reliability of other evidence; or
- the competence of a witness to testify: O’Connor, at para. 134; McNeil, at paras. 27, 33.
[85] For the purposes of this third party production regime, a record-holder need not be a complete stranger to the litigation. Recall that Crown entities, other than the prosecuting Crown, are third parties under this regime: McNeil, at para. 13. And this is so even though some records of the same entity may be subject to the first party disclosure scheme of Stinchcombe: McNeil, at para. 15.
[33] Au sujet des renseignements recherchés, mais non communiqués par la poursuite concernant, entre autres, des données historiques sur l’utilisation d’un appareil de détection approuvé dans des affaires antérieures pour des infractions semblables, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario[11] mentionne ce qui suit :
[91] Two principal factors determine the disclosure/production regime that will apply when an accused seeks disclosure of something the Crown has not provided. The first has to do with the nature of the information of which disclosure/production is sought. The second concerns who is in possession or control of that information.
[92] Turning first to the nature of the information. The descriptive “fruits of the investigation” accurately captures the subject-matter of first party/Stinchcombe disclosure. The term embraces relevant, non-privileged information related to the matters the Crown intends to adduce in evidence against an accused, as well as any information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it may assist an accused in the exercise of the right to make full answer and defence. The information may relate to the unfolding of the narrative of material events, to the credibility of witnesses or the reliability of evidence that may form part of the case to meet.
[93] In its normal, natural everyday sense the phrase “fruits of the investigation” posits a relationship between the subject-matter sought and the investigation that leads to the charges against an accused. It refers to information acquired by means and in consequence of that investigation. The information includes, but is not co-extensive with, evidence, much less admissible evidence.
[94] The disclosure/production sought in this case falls beyond the boundaries of “fruits of the investigation”.
[95] In this case, a substantial component of the information sought consists of historical records of the operation of the same approved instrument during the investigation of others for similar offences. These records have no association with the offence with which the respondent was charged and for which he faced trial. The information was not created, produced or even located during the investigation of the respondent and his alleged offences. The records played no role in the acquisition of any evidence available for proffer in the prosecution of the respondent. Indeed, much of it originates in the investigation of others for offences they are alleged to have committed at times and in places unrelated to the investigation of the respondent.
[34] Toujours selon la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario[12], dans Jackson, l’arrêt St-Onge Lamoureux[13] n’a rien changé en ce qui concerne la communication de renseignements détenus par des tiers et ne faisant pas partie des « fruits de l’enquête » pour les motifs suivants :
[99] The decision in St-Onge Lamoureux relied upon by the respondent and the intervener CLA does not mandate a different result. I reach this conclusion for several reasons.
[100] First, while it is fair to say that the St-Onge Lamoureux court considered the availability of additional disclosure about the reliability of the approved instrument as a relevant factor in its constitutional analysis, the court eschewed consideration of the nature and scope of evidence that might be considered in rebuttal and thus could be the subject of a disclosure request. Said in another way, St-Onge Lamoureux was not about disclosure.
[101] Second, St-Onge Lamoureux makes no reference to McNeil and thus to its clear distinction between information in the possession and control of the prosecuting Crown, which is critical to trigger the first party disclosure obligation, and information in the possession of other Crown entities that are third parties for disclosure purposes.
[102] Third, the paragraph of St-Onge Lamoureux upon which the respondents rely does not compel a finding that the records sought constitute first party disclosure. That passage states:
[48] The prosecution gains a clear, albeit limited, advantage from the requirement, since evidence to the contrary is limited to the real issue: whether the test results are reliable. The evidence to be tendered relates directly to an instrument that is under the prosecution’s control. The prosecution must of course disclose certain information concerning the maintenance and operation of the instrument, but it is free to establish procedures for tracking how such instruments are maintained and operated. Moreover, the prosecution has control over the people who maintain and operate the instruments. [Emphasis added.]
[103] The underscored portions, which assign control over the approved instrument and those who operate and maintain it, do not sit comfortably with the distinction made in the disclosure context in McNeil, at para. 13, that “Crown entities other than the prosecuting Crown are third parties under the O’Connor production regime.”
[…]
[105] Fourth, in a later passage in St-Onge Lamoureux, the court referred to O’Connor, the progenitor of the third party production regime, as the procedure to invoke to obtain remedies for non-disclosure:
[78] Although Parliament now requires evidence tending to establish a deficiency in the functioning or operation of the instrument, this does not mean that there are limits on the evidence that can reasonably be used by the accused to raise a doubt in this regard. The accused can request the disclosure of any relevant evidence that is reasonably available in order to be able to present a real defence. If the prosecution denies such a request, the accused can invoke the rules on non-disclosure and the available remedies for non-disclosure (see R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (CSC), 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411). In short, the accused might rely, for example, on a maintenance log that shows that the instrument was not maintained properly or on admissions by the technician that there had been erratic results, or he or she might argue that health problems had affected the functioning of the instrument (see R. v. Kasim, 2011 ABCA 336 (CanLII), 515 A.R. 254).
[106] Finally, in its later decision in Quesnelle, the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that for the purposes of “first party disclosure”, the term “the Crown” refers to the prosecuting Crown. All other Crown entities, including police, are “third parties for disclosure purposes.”
[35] Les renseignements recherchés en possession de tiers doivent être vraisemblablement pertinents pour faire l’objet d’une communication. Il s’agit là de la norme que le requérant doit rencontrer pour permettre au juge réviseur de déterminer la portée d’une ordonnance de communication éventuelle.
[36] À ce sujet, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario, toujours dans l’affaire Jackson[14], s’exprime ainsi :
[126] In the third party/O’Connor production landscape, “likely relevant” occupies a prominent place. The term designates the standard or burden an applicant must meet to have the trial judge review the records to determine whether or to what extent production will be ordered.
[127] The standard “likely relevant” imposes a significant, but not an onerous, burden on an applicant: O’Connor, at para. 24; McNeil, at para. 29. This threshold plays a meaningful role in screening applications to prevent the defence from engaging in speculative, fanciful, disruptive, unmeritorious, obstructive and time-consuming requests for production: R. v. Chaplin, 1995 CanLII 126 (CSC), 1995 CanLII 126 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 727, at para. 32; O’Connor, at para. 24; McNeil, at para. 29.
[128] The “likely relevant” threshold is not onerous because an applicant cannot be required, as a condition of accessing information that may assist in making full answer and defence, to demonstrate the specific use to which they might put information that they have not seen: R. v. Durette, 1994 CanLII 123 (CSC), 1994 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469, at p. 499; O’Connor, at para. 25; McNeil, at para. 29. The trial judge does not balance competing interests to determine whether the “likely relevant” threshold has been met under O’Connor: McNeil, at para. 32.
[129] Under the third party/O’Connor production regime, “likely relevant” means that there is a reasonable possibility that the information is logically probative to an issue at trial or to the competence of a witness to testify: O’Connor, at para. 22; McNeil, at para. 33. An “issue at trial” includes not only material issues concerning the unfolding of the events which form the subject-matter of the proceedings, but also evidence relating to the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of other evidence: O’Connor, at para. 22; McNeil, at para. 33.
[130] Under O’Connor, an applicant who satisfies the “likely relevance” standard is entitled to have the records sought produced to the trial judge for inspection to determine whether, or to what extent, the records will be produced to the applicant: McNeil, at para. 34.
(Le Tribunal souligne)
[37] En l’espèce, rien n’indique que la mise en cause a démontré à l’intimée en quoi les renseignements recherchés pouvaient être vraisemblablement pertinents pour assurer sa défense.
[38] Il s’agit là d’une erreur de droit à la face même du dossier.