Comme il a maintes fois été énoncé, et nous le répétons en l’espèce, les tribunaux doivent avoir à l’esprit la preuve concernant la santé mentale lorsque cette preuve est pertinente à l’égard de questions touchant la responsabilité criminelle. C’est particulièrement le cas dans le cadre des directives aux jurés, afin de les aider à utiliser une telle preuve de manière appropriée.
La juge O’Bonsawin (avec l’accord des juges Rowe, Martin et Moreau) — Il s’agit d’un appel visant l’arrêt R. c. Lawlor, 2022 ONCA 645, 418 C.C.C. (3d) 87, dans lequel les juges majoritaires ont rejeté l’appel formé par Derrick Lawlor contre la déclaration de culpabilité pour meurtre au premier degré prononcée contre lui par un jury. La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a rejeté l’appel à la majorité; le juge Nordheimer aurait accueilli l’appel et ordonné un nouveau procès.
Seulement deux moyens d’appel sont soumis à notre Cour. Le premier porte sur la question de savoir si le juge du procès a fait erreur dans ses directives au jury relativement à l’utilisation de la preuve concernant la santé mentale de l’accusé et à l’intention requise à l’égard de l’infraction de meurtre au premier degré. Le second porte sur la preuve relative au comportement après le fait.
Notre Cour est majoritairement d’avis d’accueillir l’appel sur la base du moyen relatif à l’intention requise pour l’infraction de meurtre et de meurtre au premier degré, mais non sur la base du moyen relatif au comportement après le fait. Pour ce qui est du premier moyen, nous souscrivons substantiellement aux motifs du juge Nordheimer. Pour ce qui est du second moyen, nous souscrivons substantiellement aux motifs des juges majoritaires de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario. Nous ajouterions le commentaire suivant.
Comme il a maintes fois été énoncé, et nous le répétons en l’espèce, les tribunaux doivent avoir à l’esprit la preuve concernant la santé mentale lorsque cette preuve est pertinente à l’égard de questions touchant la responsabilité criminelle. C’est particulièrement le cas dans le cadre des directives aux jurés, afin de les aider à utiliser une telle preuve de manière appropriée.
En conséquence, l’appel est accueilli, la déclaration de culpabilité est annulée et un nouveau procès est ordonné.
Je suis d’accord avec mes collègues pour dire que les tribunaux doivent avoir à l’esprit la preuve concernant la santé mentale dans les affaires criminelles, y compris dans le cadre des directives au jury.
Le juge Kasirer — Je rejetterais l’appel. Je me permets deux observations.
Premièrement, je suis d’accord avec mes collègues pour dire que les tribunaux doivent avoir à l’esprit la preuve concernant la santé mentale dans les affaires criminelles, y compris dans le cadre des directives au jury. Comme l’ont écrit les juges majoritaires de la Cour d’appel, il est indubitable que la preuve de problèmes de santé mentale peut être pertinente à l’égard de questions touchant l’intention ainsi que la préméditation et le propos délibéré, y compris dans l’appréciation du caractère adéquat d’un exposé au jury (voir les par. 41 et 44-48).
R. v. Lawlor, 2022 ONCA 645, j. Nordheimer
Evidence of mental illness is capable of undermining the mental element for murder in s. 229(a) (thereby reducing liability from second degree murder to manslaughter). It may also undermine the added mental elements of planning and deliberation in s. 231(2).
[128] As I have said, the trial judge does not mention any of the considerable evidence that was before the jury regarding the appellant’s mental health, and the perilous state it was in at the time of the homicide. He did not do so notwithstanding that this evidence was of more significance to the issue of intent than was the evidence about the appellant’s alcohol consumption. And intent was a critical issue in this case. Mental health evidence is important to the issue of intent for the reasons enunciated by Trotter J.A. in R. v. Spence, 2017 ONCA 619, 353 C.C.C. (3d) 446, at para. 49:
[E]vidence of mental illness is capable of undermining the mental element for murder in s. 229(a) (thereby reducing liability from second degree murder to manslaughter). It may also undermine the added mental elements of planning and deliberation in s. 231(2): see More v. The Queen, 1963 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1963] S.C.R. 522, at pp. 533-535; and McMartin v. The Queen, 1964 CanLII 43 (SCC), [1964] S.C.R. 484, at pp. 493-495.
[129] In my view, it is not sufficient, in response to this concern, to say that the mental health evidence was before the jury and that they would have considered it. There is no reason to assume that would have happened. The jury was told to follow the trial judge’s instructions on the law, as every jury is. When a trial judge does not mention a body of evidence, when relating other evidence on an issue as important as one of the elements of the offence, there is every prospect that a jury would conclude that the mental health evidence was not relevant to that issue. After all, the jury would rationalize that, if that evidence had been of importance to the issue, the trial judge would have mentioned it, as he did other evidence. Further, the catch-all boilerplate statement that the jury should take into account “the rest of the evidence that sheds light on his state of mind at the time” is insufficient to override that logical conclusion or to bring the importance of this evidence to the jury’s attention in their consideration of this element of the offence.
[130] The failure of the trial judge to relate this evidence to the element of intent was an error. It is contrary to the advice given by Moldaver J. in R. v. Walle, 2012 SCC 41, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 438. While my colleague cites the decision in her reasons, she fails to emphasize the central point that Moldaver J. made when he said, at para. 65:
In the end, what is critical is that the jury be made to understand, in clear terms, that in assessing the specific intent required for murder, it should consider the whole of the evidence that could realistically bear on the accused’s mental state at the time of the alleged offence. The trial judge should alert the jury to the pertinent evidence. How detailed that recitation should be will generally be a matter for the trial judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion. [Emphasis added].
[131] Whatever may be the parameters of the trial judge’s discretion regarding the details of the evidence to be provided, they do not extend to not mentioning the evidence at all.
[132] The failure of the trial judge to relate this evidence to the element of intent meant that the jury was not properly equipped to consider that element and whether it constituted the unlawful act of manslaughter or murder. It is also a factor that would have gone to the jury’s consideration of whether, if they concluded it was murder, the murder was a planned and deliberate one. The trial judge does not mention this evidence in his instructions on that element of the offence either.
There is no requirement for an expert opinion on this issue
[134] My colleague attempts to avoid the effect of these missing elements in the jury instructions in a number of ways. First, she downplays the mental health evidence by characterizing it as “limited”. I do not know of any principle that excuses a trial judge from mentioning evidence that is relevant to an element of the offence charged just because the evidence is not as strong as it might have been. As my colleague acknowledges, there is no requirement for an expert opinion on this issue: Spence, at para. 45; R. v. Reeves, 2017 BCCA 97, 352 C.C.C. (3d) 66, at para. 17.
