Directive Vetrovec : Il s’agit non pas de savoir si le juge du procès estime personnellement que le témoin est digne de foi, mais plutôt de savoir s’il existe des facteurs qui, d’après ce que l’expérience enseigne, exigent d’aborder avec circonspection le récit du témoin.

Beauchamp c. R., 2022 QCCA 339

[8] The refusal to give a Vetrovec instruction can amount to reversible error if the need for a robust caution is not given sufficient attention.[6] A clear and sharp instruction is not required if, despite elements that might impugn the weight of his or her testimony, the witness appears sufficiently credible.[7] The refusal to give a Vetrovec warning does not restrict the discretion of the judge to include a direction that is less pointed or robust concerning the need for caution in the evaluation of the credit due to a witness’s testimony.[8] The decision to refuse, or to give, a Vetrovec instruction will not amount to reversible error unless it is unfounded in law or it creates undue prejudice.[9]

[7]         The Supreme Court has approved the following comments on the application of the principles in Vetrovec as stated in an article by Marc Rosenberg:

The judge should first in an objective way determine whether there is a reason to suspect the credibility of the witness according to the traditional means by which such determinations are made. This would include a review of the evidence to determine whether there are factors which have properly led the courts to be wary of accepting a witness’s evidence. Factors might include involvement in criminal activities, a motive to lie by reason of connection to the crime or to the authorities, unexplained delay in coming forward with the story, providing different accounts on other occasions, lies told under oath, and similar considerations. It is not then whether the trial judge personally finds the witness trustworthy but whether there are factors which experience teaches that the witness’s story be approached with caution. Second, the trial judge must assess the importance of the witness to the Crown’s case. If the witness plays a relatively minor role in the proof of guilt it is probably unnecessary to burden the jury with a special caution and then review the confirmatory evidence. However, the more important the witness the greater the duty on the judge to give the caution. At some point, as where the witness plays a central role in the proof of guilt, the warning is mandatory. This, in my view, flows from the duty imposed on the trial judge in criminal cases to review the evidence and relate the evidence to the issues.[5]

[8]         The refusal to give a Vetrovec instruction can amount to reversible error if the need for a robust caution is not given sufficient attention.[6] A clear and sharp instruction is not required if, despite elements that might impugn the weight of his or her testimony, the witness appears sufficiently credible.[7] The refusal to give a Vetrovec warning does not restrict the discretion of the judge to include a direction that is less pointed or robust concerning the need for caution in the evaluation of the credit due to a witness’s testimony.[8] The decision to refuse, or to give, a Vetrovec instruction will not amount to reversible error unless it is unfounded in law or it creates undue prejudice.[9]

The objective in Vetrovec was to liberate the law from rules of undue formalism relating to the principle of corroboration and to replace them with due recognition of the judge’s discretion to fashion appropriate instructions that reflect the underlying imperatives of principle.

[36]      The objective in Vetrovec was to liberate the law from rules of undue formalism relating to the principle of corroboration and to replace them with due recognition of the judge’s discretion to fashion appropriate instructions that reflect the underlying imperatives of principle.[15] In Khela the Supreme Court summarised those imperatives:

(1) drawing the attention of the jury to the testimonial evidence requiring special scrutiny; (2) explaining why this evidence is subject to special scrutiny; (3) cautioning the jury that it is dangerous to convict on unconfirmed evidence of this sort, though the jury is entitled to do so if satisfied that the evidence is true; and (4) that the jury, in determining the veracity of the suspect evidence, should look for evidence from another source tending to show that the untrustworthy witness is telling the truth as to the guilt of the accused.[16]

[37]      The Court explained clearly that these imperatives were not in themselves formal rules that required strict adherence but guidelines to assist judges to formulate instructions in their discretion that satisfy two objectives:

[47]      It is not “overly formalistic” to ensure that triers of fact attain the appropriate level of comfort before convicting an accused on the basis of what has for centuries been considered unreliable evidence. A truly functional approach must take into account the dual purpose of the Vetrovec warning: first, to alert the jury to the danger of relying on the unsupported evidence of unsavoury witnesses and to explain the reasons for special scrutiny of their testimony; and second, in appropriate cases, to give the jury the tools necessary to identify evidence capable of enhancing the trustworthiness of those witnesses.[17]

[38]      In Durand this court enumerated some of the factors that might support reasons to impugn the credibility of a witness and to justify a Vetrovec warning:

[123]   La question de la nécessité d’une directive de type Vetrovec repose sur une approche fonctionnelle, fondée sur le bon sens et l’expérience judiciaire. Au titre des facteurs propres à mettre objectivement en doute la crédibilité d’un témoin, les tribunaux retiennent, entre autres, la complicité du témoin dans le fait ou après le fait, les témoins de mauvaise réputation, ceux qui ont fait des déclarations mensongères dans le passé, les témoins ayant un lourd casier judiciaire ou ayant un mode de vie criminel, les consommateurs ou trafiquants de stupéfiants, le fait que le témoin croit avoir un intérêt personnel à témoigner contre l’accusé, le retard inexpliqué pour présenter sa version des faits aux autorités, le caractère spécifique de la présumée confession (du type : « j’ai tué X ») et la mesure dans laquelle la déclaration renferme des détails que seul l’auteur de l’infraction connaît, ainsi que l’accès à des sources extérieures de renseignements.[18]