R. v. Farinacci, 2015 ONCA 392
(voir aussi Kenol c. R., 2016 QCCA 509)
Existe-t-il une possibilité que la preuve extrinsèque puisse avoir affectée le verdict du jury?
[26] It is common ground that R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer, 2001 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344, at para. 59, expresses the governing test, “[E]vidence indicating that the jury has been exposed to some information or influence from outside the jury should be admissible for the purpose of considering whether or not there is a reasonable possibility that this information or influence had an effect upon the jury’s verdict.”
[27] On the other hand, jurors are not blank slates. They are expected to use their general knowledge, life experience and knowledge in coming to a decision. As observed in R. v. Pan, at para. 61:
Jurors are expected to bring to their task their entire life’s experiences. It is on the basis of what they know about human behaviour, knowledge that they have obviously acquired outside the courtroom, that they are requested to assess credibility and to draw inferences from proven facts. Even though not the object of evidence tendered in the trial, an opinion, a piece of general information, or even some specialized knowledge that a juror may reveal in the course of the deliberations, is not an extrinsic matter. Typically, such information would not be the object of evidence tendered at trial. It would be viewed as either irrelevant, too remote, or as attempting to usurp the functions of the jury. On the other hand, if a juror, or a third party, conveys to the jury information that bears directly on the case at hand that was not admitted at trial, by reason of an oversight or a strategic decision by counsel or, worse yet, by operation of an exclusionary rule of admissibility, then it is truly a matter “extrinsic” to the deliberation process and the fact that it was introduced into that process may be revealed.