I accept that an admission (of a fact) made by an accused in a prosecution for a provincial statutory offence may be admitted in evidence against him at a subsequent criminal trial. However, I see no equivalence between a guilty plea in provincial court and a guilty plea deemed made by virtue of a statutory presumption arising from the payment of a ticket for a traffic offence.
55] The judge treats the paying of the ticket (deemed a guilty plea under s. 162 C.P.P.) as an admission of the commission of the actus reus – i.e. that the Appellant was driving. He uses this as corroboration of part of Ms. Dondo’s testimony. When coupled with the fact that the judge did not believe Appellant, his conclusion was that the Appellant was, beyond reasonable doubt, the driver.
 I take exception with the use of this element as corroboration. Corroboration is evidence “which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, but also that the prisoner committed it”. The evidence is the payment. The fact of paying the ticket does not confirm that the Appellant was the driver. People sometimes pay tickets to avoid the inconvenience of contesting but do not admit the contravention as a fact. Here, the “corroboration” stems from the legal presumption (arising from such payment) that he pleaded guilty (pursuant to s. 162 C.P.P.) and thus, admitted the element of the statutory infraction (under s. 171 H.S.C.), i.e. that he was driving. Corroboration must stem from the proof of a fact, not a legal presumption of a guilty plea which supposes an admission of the commission of the actus reus of the offence.
 Moreover, the presumption in question originates in a provincial statute and not in the Criminal Code. The presumption of innocence in a criminal matter should withstand the application of a presumption in a provincial statutory offence. The presumption of a guilty plea was used by the judge to dispel his doubt as to the Appellant’s guilt, which is a breach of the presumption of innocence.
 I underline that Appellant did not plead guilty to the statutory infraction while assisted by counsel in front of a judge who verifies an accused’s understanding of what it means to plead guilty and that the accused is acknowledging having committed the infraction of which he is charged. Rather, Appellant signed and mailed a cheque – nothing more. The admission of an element of the offence should be clear and unequivocal which is hardly the case when that admission stems not from what an accused states but from a statutory presumption.
 I accept that an admission (of a fact) made by an accused in a prosecution for a provincial statutory offence may be admitted in evidence against him at a subsequent criminal trial. However, I see no equivalence between a guilty plea in provincial court and a guilty plea deemed made by virtue of a statutory presumption arising from the payment of a ticket for a traffic offence. One cannot admit a fact unwittingly, which is the effect of inferring the admission from a presumptive guilty plea. Aside from the lack of prior disclosure of the evidence in this case and the absence of the documentary evidence (i.e. the ticket and confirmation of receipt of payment), the judge did not consider at all whether the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The latter is obvious while the probative value can certainly be questioned given that the ticket and documentary confirmation of payment were never produced. Indeed, it appears from the transcript that the judge never even saw the ticket.